JPRS 74225

21 September 1979

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1465

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50272-101

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE	1. REPORT NO. JPRS 74225	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.
4. Title and Subtitle USSR REPORT: MILITARY AFFAIRS, No. 1465			5. Report Date 21 September 1979 6.
7. Author(s)			8. Performing Organization Rept. No.
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201			10. Project/Task/Work Unit No. 11. Contract(C) or Grant(G) No. (C) (G)
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above			13. Type of Report & Period Covered 14.

15. Supplementary Notes

16. Abstract (Limit: 200 words)

This serial report contains information on Soviet military and civil defense establishments, leadership, doctrine, policy, planning, political affairs, organization, and equipment.

17. Document Analysis a. Descriptors

USSR
Military Organizations
Military Facilities
Military Personnel
Civil Defense

b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms

c. COSATI Field/Group 15C

18. Availability Statement	19. Security Class (This Report)	21. No. of Pages
Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22161	UNCLASSIFIED	79
	20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED	22. Price

(See ANSI-Z39.18)

OPTIONAL FORM 272 (4-77)
(Formerly NTIS-35)
Department of Commerce

JPRS 74225

21 September 1979

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CONTENTS

PAGE

Status of Military Political Organs
(A. Yepishev; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, May 79) 1

Instructions for Seminar on Scientific-Technical Revolution
(KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, May 79) 11

Comments on New Brezhnev Book
(KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, May 79) 17

Medical Care of Servicemen Discussed
(F. Komarov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, May 79) 29

Methods of Improving Law and Order Discussed
(V. Novikov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, May 79) 37

Indoctrination Methods Aboard Missile Cruiser Described
(N. Sinitsyn; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, May 79) 45

Plan for Indoctrination on Armed Forces Development Outlined
(V. Yermachenkov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, May 79) 52

Pentagon Propaganda Machine's Reactionary Objectives Revealed
(V. Amel'chenko; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, May 79) 66

Book Describes Lenin's Role in Naval Development
(G. Komarov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, May 79) 75

STATUS OF MILITARY POLITICAL ORGANS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 9, May 79
signed to press 4 Apr 79 pp 8-18

[Article by Army General A. Yepishev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate: "Combat Organs of the Party"]

[Text] The Soviet armed forces are indebted for all of their glorious victories and their present combat might to the wise leadership of the Communist Party. The party's active organizational and ideological work insures the effective use of the material and spiritual potential of our army and navy in the interests of the reliable defense of the revolutionary achievements of socialism.

The leadership of the Communist Party is an objective and natural law-governed process in the development of a socialist society. This process is active within all of the life spheres of the Soviet state, including military organizational development and the improvement and strengthening of the armed forces and the defense of socialism.

The party organs occupy a leading place in the provision of whole-hearted CPSU leadership of the armed forces. Today, during the time of the 60th anniversary of the creation of the Political Directorate of the republic's Revolutionary Military Council, which completed the formation of the system of political organs, the major contribution made by these combat organs of the party in the development of the army and navy is particularly vivid. In cooperation with the party organizations and in close unity with the commanders, the organs persistently worked for the practical implementation of the policies of the Leninist party and its Central Committee aimed at improving the armed forces and enhancing combat readiness. As part of its daily routine, the party brings its organizational and guiding influence to bear on all aspects of the training and education

of army and navy personnel, on the experiences and everyday life of the troops, and on the solution of wartime combat tasks. The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee comrade L. I. Brezhnev, when speaking of the sources of our great victory in World War II, stresses the exceptional amount that was contributed toward the victory by "army party organizations, members of the military councils, chiefs of political organs, and our selfless political workers." ("Leninskim kursom," Vol 2, p 67).

The 60-year path that has been travelled by our political organs serves as a convincing affirmation of the vital force of the principles that are at the base of their construction and activity. It is a question of those important instructions through which the party insures its leadership over the armed forces by implementing the requirements that they contain.

Seen from the heights that have been attained, one thing that is most evident is the scientific substantiation of the principle of our party building in the form of the unification of political and military leadership. While acting as the leading party organs of the Communist Party within the armed forces, the political organs unite and lead the army and navy communists. They have specific administrative and regulatory rights, and are subordinate to the military commands. This form of party building within the army and navy allows for flexibility and the operational importance of party political work, its continuity and high efficiency, and the consolidation of party influence over all aspects of the life of armed forces personnel.

The transition of the USSR armed forces into a peacetime status posed new problems for the political organs and fostered the restructuring of the content of their work. In accordance with the new tasks contained in a decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee that was adopted late in February of 1946, the USSR Armed Forces Main Political Directorate was set up to operate as a section of the party Central Committee. This leading party organ within the armed forces has been redesignated since April 1953 as the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate. This designation reflects more completely its tasks and the content of its activity. The directorate manages party political work within the army and navy and is responsible to the CPSU Central Committee for its status within units and on board naval ships.

The Bureau of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate was established with the goal of providing for collectiveness in solving significant problems of party political work and in educating the cadres of political workers. As a collective organ, the bureau discusses practical questions of

the activity of political organs and party and komsomol organizations, generalizes the experience of party political work within the army and navy, and formulates the necessary recommendations for its improvement. The bureau also examines proposals for the training, distribution, and education of staff political cadres.

The importance of party political work and the roles of the political organs is increasing in keeping with the growing leadership and guidance role of the Leninist party within all of the spheres of Soviet society, including the armed forces. While wrestling with issues connected with the further strengthening of the spiritual potential of the country and the armed forces, the party Central Committee and the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee are doing all that is necessary to expand and deepen the influence of party political work over all aspects of life within the army and navy. In compliance with the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On Measures for Improving Party Political Work in the USSR Army and Navy," organizational and practical measures have been adopted to improve the structure of the political and party organizations.

With the goals of enhancing the operational importance and the concreteness of the leadership of party political work and to insure its closer ties to the solution of tasks of combat and mobilization readiness and the combat preparedness of the troops, political directorates were formed in the branches of the armed forces, as well as among railroad and construction troops and within political sections in some combined units. The activities of these political organs rapidly have justified their existence and demonstrated their vital force. The organs actively are influencing the status of the work among the troops and the naval forces.

Experience has shown the need for the reorganization of the headquarters party committees, military academies, and scientific and research organizations into appropriate political sections. Existing political organs have been reinforced organizationally and the experience of their work is enriched year in and year out.

The decisions of the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses on the further imporvement of the leadership role of the party and the improvement of party leadership within all sections of communist building have a principal significance for the activity of the political organs under contemporary conditions. These party decisions, along with the growing importance of the political organs in relation to the changes occurring within the armed forces in recent years, are reflected in the statute concerning the army and navy political organs that was approved by the

CPSU Central Committee in February 1973. The statute emphasizes the responsibility of the political organs to strengthen the combat might of the army and navy during the performance of their work, while insuring the daily and whole-hearted influence of the party over every aspect of the life and activity of the armed forces.

Having created a unified system of organs that conforms to the tasks and forms of Soviety military organizational development, the party strives to have party political work reflect in full measure the processes and phenomena that characterize the dynamics of the social relations of developed socialism, the upsurge in political awareness and in the general educational training of youth, the intensification of the demands for the security of the motherland, and changes in the technical aspects of military science.

As with everything else, the political organs are developing continuously in accordance with the spirit and demands of time. What is seen as vital in this plan is the comprehensive substantiation of the proposals, which have been submitted for consideration, on the improvement of the party political apparatus. Organizational measures are not in and of themselves the primary concern here; rather that everything that is done in this connection agrees to a maximum extent with the tasks placed before the armed forces by the party.

The practical work of the army and navy political organs and the party organizations is developed in continuous agreement with the party's activities and mirrors the party's plans and designs and a concern for the security of communist building. Under modern conditions, all of the activities of the political organs and party organizations have been subordinated to the fulfillment of party decisions on increasing the defensive might of the country and the combat readiness of the armed forces.

The material and spiritual values of society under developed socialism are being augmented with each passing year, the life of the workers is becoming richer and more beautiful, and the power of the motherland is being strengthened. As has been emphasized in a CPSU Central Committee appeal to all of the electors and citizens of the Soviet Union, the labor of the Soviet people has created an enormous production potential, which insures the progressive development of the economy -- a primary factor in the growth of the welfare of the people and in maintaining the defensive posture of the country at a proper level.

Even while they are occupied with constructive labor, our people should not overlook the complex and contradictory state of the

world situation. Along with the trends toward detente, the situation also is characterized by the increasing activity of the forces of imperialism and reaction. A series of actions that have been observed in recent months testify to the fact that influential political circles within the United States and other NATO countries are striving to return to the "Cold War" era by attempting to use force to crush liberation movements.

The Beijing rulers, who are leaning toward the NATO arsenals, are turning up in the same camp as the imperialist reactionaries. By their unprecedentedly impertinent marauding attack on socialist Vietnam, the rulers revealed conclusively to the eyes of the world the aggressive essence of the great power policy of hegemony that they are supporting. The aggressive actions of the Chinese against their neighboring socialist state demonstrate the extent of the irresponsible attitude that Beijing holds toward the fate of the world and with what criminal ease the Chinese militarists are capable of firing their weapons.

The forces of imperialism and reaction attempt to justify their military preparations and the arms race on the myth of the "Soviet military threat." The lack of substance of these attempts becomes especially clear in the light of the indisputable facts of history, which are verified by the high destiny of the armed forces of the land of the Soviets and their leading role in social progress. All of the wars that our army and navy have been obliged to participate in have turned out to be justified to the highest possible extent and were conducted to defend the socialist achievements of the people.

The Leninist party and our government continue even now to do everything that is necessary reliably to protect the constructive labor of the Soviet people. CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet comrade L. I. Brezhnev in a speech to the electors of the Bauman election district in the capital stated: "We are spending as much as is absolutely necessary on defense. No more and no less. It is governed by the situation."

Soviet servicemen look on their military labor as a component part of the national campaign to carry out the decisions of the 25th party congress and the demands of the CPSU Central Committee and of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet comrade L. I. Brezhnev in the area of strengthening the defense. The servicemen are concentrating their attention on further improvements in the qualitative indicators for combat and political training and the strengthening of discipline and organization. Winter

training exercises revealed that stepped-up training is being carried out within the groups of forces and military districts and on board the ships of the fleet, and that the servicemen actively are fighting to increase the number of excellent performers and class specialists and to enhance combat readiness.

The activity of the political organs has been raised to a new level in recent years, and its content, form, and methods have been enriched. The party election meetings and party conferences that were held recently served as a broad and exacting party examination of the results of the fulfillment by the military cadres, political organs, and party organizations of the tasks stemming from the decisions of the 25th party congress. The results demonstrate with new force the monolithic unity and tight cohesion of the army and navy communists toward the party Central Committee and their unanimous approval of the multifaceted activity of the CPSU Central Committee and the Politburo under the leadership of comrade L. I. Brezhnev in implementing a Leninist course of domestic and foreign policy and of further enhancement of the defensive capability of the country.

The political organs are working under modern conditions against the background of the growing leadership role of the party in military organizational development, which is reflected in the profound elaboration of questions of military policy and in the scientific determination of the significant directions in the development of the armed forces and the organization of party political work within them. The party Central Committee is furnishing us with precise guidance and providing purposefulness to the political work within the army and navy, while making the work more effective. An enormous surge of inspiration and enthusiasm was aroused in army and navy personnel by the elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet; the speech of Party Central Committee General Secretary and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet comrade L. I. Brezhnev to the electors, and his directives aimed at further strengthening the might of the motherland and its security; and the decisions of the April 1979 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the First Session of the 10th Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

A scientific approach that is being introduced more widely into all of the links of party building within the armed forces is serving to increase the effectiveness of the work of the political organs. The analysis of the processes and phenomena that occur among the troops has become more basic. New trends, the natural law-governed process of development and the qualitative changes in personnel, weapons, and the methods of conducting combat operations are being taken into account to a greater extent. Many vital issues of party building in terms of the

decisions of the 25th party congress have received an in-depth elaboration in the reports from a scientific practical conference of leading workers within army and navy political organs, as well as in those given at theoretical conferences that are being carried out during this anniversary year within the military districts, groups of forces, and on board ships. It has become necessary to strive for the further raising of the level of the theoretical analysis of the practices of party political work and for a comprehensive foundation for ways of improving the activity of the political organs.

Responding to the increasing tasks and demands of the CPSU Central Committee, political organs have been called upon to focus their efforts on the qualitative solution to problems of combat readiness. Using inherent forms and methods of work, they have started to coordinate their activity more purposefully with the fundamental problems of training the troops and naval forces.

Specific changes in the style of the work of the political organs, in their implementation of control and assistance activities in the field, and in the ability to analyze the status of a situation and stimulate creativity infer an even more decisive change of approach toward problems of quality. In essence, quality criteria must become a routine part of our thinking and act as a form of daily guidance. We see this as the true path to the further improvement of party political work.

The decisions of the November 1978 and April 1979 party Central Committee plenums, and the presentations given at the plenums by comrade L. I. Brezhnev are having a mobilizing effect on the activity of the political organs. They are stimulating us to evaluate our activity more exactingly, to examine the content of party work more deeply and in greater detail, to identify ways to improve its quality and effectiveness, and to eliminate rapidly existing shortcomings and defects.

An important indicator that we use to approach the evaluation of the multifaceted activity of the political organs and party organizations is the effectiveness of the work in support of the continuous combat readiness of the troops and naval forces, the vigilance of the personnel, the performance of socialist competition, and the strengthening of discipline. The business-like criticism by political organs and party organizations is helping some units, ships, and combined units that are failing to provide continuous positive influence on the solution of combat readiness tasks, have not manifested proper exactingness toward communist leaders, and have investigated superficially the status of the combat skills of personnel, discipline, and organization.

The enhancement of party influence over combat preparedness assumes the increased strengthening of the political tempering of the servicemen, and the formation in them of high political awareness as an important factor in the struggle for quality combat skills.

The ideological activity of the political organs currently is being filled intensively with new content and is assuming a more creative character in the process of the in-depth study of the materials of the 25th CPSU Congress, subsequent party Central Committee plenums, the new USSR Constitution, and the speech of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet comrade L. I. Brezhnev to the electors. Political, military, legal, and moral education within units and on board vessels is being improved.

All of these improvements should not blind us to the fact that the ideological work of some political organs ineffectually is influencing the completion of combat training tasks, the strengthening of discipline, and the formation of an active outlook on life by personnel. The daily work of certain of the organizers of the training and education process is not responsive to contemporary requirements. Some party and komsomol activists are deficient in the solid weapons of theoretical knowledge and political training methods and the ability to take the increasing spiritual needs of servicemen into account during propaganda work.

The Soviet serviceman anticipates that party leaders, propagandists, and lecturers will give graphic and convincing talks on domestic and international issues, along with answers to his burning questions. One of today's vital tasks for political organs and party organizations is to show concern for the ideological direction and the clarity of all methods in political mass work, to eliminate formalism and boring content in this work, and to identify the most effective ways of influencing the spiritual side of the individual.

Using all of the means of organizational and ideological work, the political organs have been called on to strengthen and develop further the high patriotic upsurge inspired by the elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Much of what happens will be dependent on increases in the effectiveness of socialist competition.

The organization and leadership of the competition involves a constant search for those forms, methods, and techniques for increasing the creative initiative of the servicemen that most completely agree with the specific timing and character of the tasks being fulfilled by a unit or subunit and with the

qualitative attributes of the personnel. The enhancement of party exactingness toward those who treat the competition triflingly and who stir up a racket and verbal blather toward it will make it possible to use more rationally this mighty means of developing the social activeness of the servicemen.

A central question in the activity of political organs is that of military dsicipline. The status of discipline affects the completion of the tasks facing the army and navy. However, the requirements for organization and order and the cohesion of military collectives are growing and the importance of the disciplined attitudes and industriousness of each serviceman is increasing. The political sections have available to them great potential for the study of the facts and phenomena that characterize a true level of lawful order and on this foundation to formulate proposals aimed at the further strengthening of discipline. It is important that commanders and political workers be taught how to analyze all of the complex and diverse planning aspects of the problems relating to the individual, his awareness, moral fiber, and psychology, and how to uncover the causes behind the undisciplined behavior of individual servicemen and to remedy these causes. Methods applied in this training often include the setting up of meetings and conferences, the organization of inspections, and the registering of shortcomings, which normally doesn't introduce innovation into the life of the units and doesn't resolve issues satisfactorily.

The further strengthening of military discipline assumes the strict observance of the Leninist principle of one-man management and an increase in the authority of commanders. The maintenance of the authority of any given officer is not, of course, only a factor of the political organs. Here, the most significant factors are the officer's own work performance, his personal behavior, and the example that he sets in complying with Soviet law, military regulations, and the norms of communist morals. When an officer breaks the rules, behaves unworthily, and commits misdemeanors, he forfeits the moral authority of leadership. We should display rigid exactingness and severity toward such commanders and political workers. Leaders must appear as models of an irrproachable attitude to their duties in the eyes of their colleagues, and as a magnetic example of moral purity to their subordinates.

The party commissions within the political organs promote in many ways the inculcation of a high sense of responsibility by the communists for their assigned duties and for discipline. The range of the activities of the commissions has expanded markedly in recent years. They are tasked with improving the qualitative makeup of party ranks and they participate actively

in evaluations of the observance of the CPSU rules by members and candidate members of the party and their maintenance of party and state discipline. The responsibility clearly is not limited to the uncovering and punishment of rule violations; although this also must be done skillfully and on a timely basis. The party organizations must be assisted in forestalling violations, in learning how to analyze events in their entirety, in formulating and implementing proposals for eliminating shortcomings, and in exercising control over the carrying out of the decisions that have been adopted.

Experienced political workers who have been trained in theoretical studies work in our political organs. They carry the responsibility on their shoulders for any problem that is concerned with the strengthening of party influence on the life of personnel, on the work and rest of the servicemen, and on the formation of a healthy moral atmosphere within the collectives. Communists working within the komsomols play an important role here. A prinary duty of communists in the army and navy is to educate the army and navy youth concerning the revolutionary, labor, and military combat traditions of the party, the people, and the armed forces; on the concepts of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism; and in the spirit of rigid compliance with the requirements of oaths, regulations, and the moral norms of Soviet life.

In practice, the militancy of a political organ and the force of its influence on the activities of military collectives to a large extent are determined by how amicably the program's workers act and the kind of life tone that they set for the communists and the personnel in unit and combined units. An atmosphere of comradely and principalled exactingness, self-criticism, and mutual assistance is particularly important within the collective of a political section. The collective efforts of the workers with the aim of attaining a comprehensively substantiated goal of measures, checks and equipping of troops are creating a reliable base for increasing the influence of the political organs on the fulfillment of the tasks faced by units and combined units.

After examining the path that has been travelled by the army and navy political organs over the past 60 years, we can state with complete license that they have justified honorably their high importance at every stage of their development and improvement. Under the leadership of the party, its Leninist Central Committee, and the Politburo led by comrade L.I. Brezhnev, the combat organs of the party will make a major contribution toward increasing the combat might of the armed forces and strengthening the defensive capability of our country, which is building communism.

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SEMINAR ON SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL REVOLUTION

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 9, May 79
signed to press 4 Apr 79, pp 27-28

[Article: "Recommendations for a Seminar Lesson"]

[Text] The seminar lesson "Dialectics of a Social and Scientific-Technical Revolution Under Contemporary Conditions. Scientific-Ptechnical Progress and the Development of Military Science" has special meaning for students of Marxist-Leninist training groups who are studying vital problems of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. This lesson furnishes the opportunity to summarize the knowledge that has already been assimilated and from this basis to interpret philosphically the complex of phenomena engendered by the scientific-technical revolution.

Recommended themes for discussion are: 1. The main points and content of the scientific-technical revolution. The 25th CPSU Congress in relation to the speeding up of scientific-technical progress in the Soviet Union. 2. The relationship of social and scientific-technical progress. A critique of bourgeois and revisionist distortions of the main points and the social consequences and prospects for the modern scientific-technical revolution. 3. The characteristics of the effects of scientific-technical progress on military science under opposing social systems.

It would be worthwhile during the course of the seminar to present the paper: "Work Style of Soviet Military Cadres Under the Conditions of the Scientific-Technical Revolution." Here the well-known theses of the 25th party congress should be followed. Since our army and navy ojbectively have been on the crest of the scientific-technical revolution, each officer should keep abreast of its achievements and constantly add to his knowledge, assimilate a feeling for innovation, and skillfully put innovations into practice and into the curriculum for training and educating personnel.

When discussing the first theme, it is important to explain that the scientific-technical revolution is not so much a revolution of science for science's sake, but rather of the assisting of science. Consequently, its essence is associated with changes in the characteristics of the scientific ties with social practice in general and with production work in particular. The process of transforming science into a direct productive force was foreseen in the classics of Marxism-Leninism, which gave the process its proper philosophical substantiation.

The accomplishments of the scientific-technical revolution are not implemented automatically. Therefore, the Communist Party is striving, through improvements in the economic system and in the methods of planning and incentives, to create the conditions that will foster extensively not just scientific development, but also the most rapid passage of new ideas through all of the stages from the invention to the mass production of new products and to set up reliable screens against stagnation and routine. "All of these," comrade L. I. Brezhnev notes, "are profound party tasks, and within all of our economic building there are perhaps no other tasks today that are more vital or responsible." ("Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," p 49).

The scientific-technical potential of the Soviet Union is exceptionally impressive. A total of 1.3 million scientific workers are employed in the country, including approximately 360,000 candidate and 36,000 doctors of science. The government has allocated 19.9 billion rubles in the current year for scientific research. Taking these increasing potentials into consideration, the party has mapped out new boundaries for scientific-technical progress and for the national campaign for the application of the results of this progress in the interests of building the material and technical base for communism and for the resulting implementation of a program to improve the welfare and culture of the workers.

The 25th party congress established such major directions for scientific-technical progress during the current five-year plan and in the long term as further improvements in the production of the means of labor and materials, the improvement of technological processes, and the expansion of power engineering. A unified technical policy that is carried out within a planned economic system must insure that there is agreement with all of the trends in the development of science and technology.

The second theme of the seminar deals with the philosophic basis of the dialectics of the social and scientific-technical revolution under modern conditions.

As is known, a necessary condition for the development of production is the agreement between production relations and the characteristics of the productive forces. Consequently, scientific-technical progress can achieve its full range and attain a high level only under an advanced social and economic system; conversely, social progress is unthinkable in our time unless there is a powerful development of science and technology and of the attendant production.

Scientific-technical and social progress, while they are two aspects of a single natural historic process, at the same time do contain relatively independent characteristics. In fact, herein lie the deep roots of the antagonistic contradiction, which is characteristic of a capitalist society, between the level of development of the productive forces and the narrow limits of the existing production relations. It is a contradiction that can only be resolved by a socialist revolution. Scientific-technical progress cannot exclusively alter the structure of a social system. By transforming the technical base of capitalist production and fostering its further generalization, however, the progress can exacerbate social antagonisms and make the necessity for the revolutionary restructuring of a bourgeois society even more obvious.

Under capitalism, the scientific-technical revolution not only fails to achieve its full range, but also gives rise to harsh social consequences for the working masses. The complex automation of production consequently is accompanied by a reduction in jobs and increased unemployment. The dominance of private property restricts the potential for the judicious management of social production, and encourages crises, a barbaric attitude toward environmental protection, and so on. The militarization of science and its orientation toward the development of still more weapons of mass destruction serve as a serious threat to mankind.

The modern scientific-technical revolution and its social consequences occupy a prominent place among the problems of the class struggle in the capitalist countries and of the competition between the two social systems. The imperialist bourgeoisie are striving to attach themselves to the scientific-technical revolution and to use it to maintain and strengthen their exploitativeness. With this goal in mind, the bourgeois theorists are attempting to elaborate those interpretations of the revolution that will support the imperialist forces in their fight against socialism. The essence of one of these conceptions is the conviction that capitalism and the production of profits supposedly are the most effective ways to insure the acceleration of scientific-technical progress and that the scientific-technical

revolution somehow will solve automatically all of the social contradictions of a capitalist society. A second conception passes off the contradiction of modern capitalism under the guise of a "technological civilization" in general, and reduces all of the social evils brought about by capitalism to the "spontaneous" development of technology. Technology alone is conspicuous for being the initial cause threatening the world with ecological catastrophe, the gradual alienation of people, and their moral recklessness. A "logical" conclusion stemming from all of these conceptions supports the nonnecessity and uselessness of the struggle of the workers for a fundamental restructuring of society and for social progress.

Marxism-Leninism proceeds from the assumption that the entry of mankind into the period of the great scientific-technical revolution is accompanied by the task of breaking the weak chains of capitalist relations and liberating the mighty productive forces created by man and applying them for the benefit of all of society. This assumption is being corroborated by the experience of true socialism in which the scientific-technical revolution is receiving authentic humanistic guidance and is acting as an accelerator of social progress and as a stage in the transition to a communist society.

The broad development of the scientific-technical revolution has become one of the primary factors in the historic competition between socialism and capitalism. The struggle will be prolonged and difficult. But our party and the Soviet people are filled with the decisiveness to carry out the struggle in earnest.

The third theme of the seminar supports the examination of the effects of the scientific-technical revolution on military science under the opposing social systems.

It must be stressed that imperialism, because of its very aggressive nature, is dedicated to the use of the scientific-technical gains for military objectives. This not only leads to the militarization of science itself, but also to the creation of military industrial complexes that exert enormous influence over political leaders. The striving of the monopolies to extract maximum profits is one of the reasons for the unrestrained arms race.

The socialist society by its nature has no need for an army, military production, and military science. The society was obliged to develop these solely for international reasons and to defend its achievements from the encroachments of imperialism. The socialist society is using the achievements of science

and technology for self-defense. But this in no way will lead to the militarization of science. The Communist Party and the Soviet government see the primary objectives of applying scientific-technical progress as those of communist building, increasing the standard of living of the people, and the education of a harmoniously developed person.

The effects of scientific-technical progress on the various aspects of military science should be disclosed during the discussion of this problem. These include the effects on military equipment, the processes of managing the troops, the methods and forms of conducting armed combat, and on the armed forces personnel. This will allow practical questions pertaining to the duties of the seminar participants to be raised.

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COMMENTS ON NEW BREZHNEV BOOK

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 79 signed to press 7 May 79 pp 19-27

[Article on occasion of publication of book by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" (Guarding Peace and Socialism): "Outstanding Contribution to Theory and Practice of Defense of the Socialist Homeland"]

[Text] A collection of reports, speeches, articles and other works by CPSU CC General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Chairman of the USSR Defense Council, Mar SU Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev has been published, entitled "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma."

Occupying an important place in the works of the faithful Leninist and outstanding political and state figure of modern times, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, are matters concerning the peaceloving foreign policy of the CPSU and Soviet state, the security of the Soviet Union and fraternal countries of socialism, and improvement in the USSR's defensive capability and combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces. Materials in the collection show the consistent, persistent struggle of the Communist Party and Soviet state for relaxation of international tension, for peace and international security, against the aggressive policy of imperialism and for assuring reliable defense of the achievements of the Great October.

The Soviet people and their military personnel link Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev's name with successes of the political course of the Communist Party and Soviet state at home and in the world arena. At the recent 1st session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 9th Convocation, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev again was elected unanimously as Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The re-election of the CPSU CC General Secretary to this high post demonstrates with new force the mighty unity of the Communist Party and our people. It simultaneously is a reflection of the people's deep faith in Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. It is a high evaluation of his great services in successful socio-economic development of Soviet society, in strengthening the USSR's defensive might and in creating favorable international conditions for our building of communism and for peace and progress throughout the planet.

Works by Comrade Brezhnev included in the collection "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" give clear evidence of his many-sided work to strengthen the defensive might of the Soviet land and the combat cooperation of fraternal socialist states. As stated by USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "our country's defensive capability, the might of the Soviet Armed Forces and the name L. I. Brezhnev are indivisible. In his tireless work of directing the party and state, Leonid Il'ich devotes daily attention to military organizational development and makes an enormous contribution toward strengthening the country's defensive capability and the Army and Navy's combat might."

The Communist Party has solved and is solving tasks of strengthening our country's defensive capability and increasing the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces on the basis of the ideas and methodology of Marxism-Leninism. Lenin's military-theoretical heritage has found deep reflection and further development in the CPSU Program, in decisions of party congresses and party CC plenums, and in the USSR Constitution.

Comrade Brezhnev is making an invaluable contribution toward the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the Army, the Leninist teaching on defense of the socialist homeland, Soviet military science, the theory of military art and military doctrine.

Works by Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev included in this book represent a worthy augmentation of the ideological-theoretical arsenal of the CPSU and the entire international communist movement. The theory and practice of defense of the socialist homeland and the military policy of the CPSU and Soviet state have been enriched and developed creatively in them on the basis of historical experience of the USSR and other countries of socialism, the contemporary world revolutionary process, and international relations. The works included in the collection "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" contain the key to solving many military-political problems, the answer to current issues of military organizational development, military science and military art, and a model of expert application of the method of materialistic dialectics for clearing up the essence of very complex sociopolitical phenomena.

The profound theoretical generalizations and practical advice given by Comrade Brezhnev help our command cadres, political workers, party activists and Komsomol activists daily in accomplishing tasks assigned by the party and in performing organizational and ideological indoctrination work in the spirit of modern requirements.

The vitality and instructiveness of this advice and recommendations on key issues of military affairs is natural. Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev passed over the stern roads of the Great Patriotic War in the ranks of the Armed Forces as a frontline political worker. He was an active participant in fierce fighting in the legendary Malaya Zemlya, of the battles for the Caucasus and the Ukraine, and for the liberation of Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

A major political leader, he made a great contribution toward the development and implementation of plans of many operations and performed an enormous amount of organizational and political work among the troops while deputy chief of political directorate of the Southern Front, chief of political department of 18th Army, and chief of political directorate of 4th Ukrainian Front.

The role which Chairman of the USSR Defense Council Mar SU L. I. Brezhnev plays today in management of the Army and Navy is truly great. He is engaged directly in resolving key issues of military organizational development, the training and indoctrination of military cadres and improvement of party-political work among the troops.

Our party and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev single out the problem of war and peace as the fundamental problem of modern times among the numerous current problems of world politics and international relations.

An acute class struggle characterizes the world revolutionary process. The forces of socialism, democracy and peace are prevailing more and more in this struggle over the forces of imperialism, reaction and war.

Capitalism is a society devoid of a future. Its capabilities to affect world development and capabilities of aggressive actions narrow each year. But the book being examined emphasizes that the nature of imperialism remains the same. It possesses great strength and can unleash wars and armed conflicts. Imperialism threatens mankind with a new world nuclear missile war.

Comrade Brezhnev's book thoroughly analyzes the primary directions of aggressive designs and actions of imperialist forces. This is, above all, the material preparation of war, the arms race, creation of new types of mass destruction weapons, new military alliances and military bases, and maintaining tension in various parts of the globe. This also is the continuing militarization of bourgeois society, the growing role of military industrial complexes in the life of capitalist states, and use of imperialist armies as tools of the reaction against the people of their own country and as a tool of expansion on an international scale.

Great-Khan chauvinism, the hegemonism of the Peking leaders, and international Zionism are serious sources of military danger. Shameless nationalism and racism, anticommunism and anti-Sovietism--this is what has been taken up by those who sow enmity and suspicion without principle among nations and who, deceiving the toiling masses, are ready to drive them into the hell of war for the sake of interests alien to the toilers.

Maoist leaders are openly aligning themselves today with aggressive forces of imperialism and with the most shameless reaction on the soil of

double-dyed anti-Sovietism and anticommunism. Their reckless step aimed at discontinuing the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the PRC serves as new evidence of this. They declare without ceremony that their military preparations are aimed against the USSR and other socialist countries. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted on 2 March of this year in a speech to electors, with their unprecedented impertinent, piratic attack on a small neighboring country, socialist Vietnam, the present Peking rulers revealed to the entire world once and for all the crafty, aggressive essence of their great power, hegemonic policy. Now everyone can see that this very policy represents the most serious threat to peace around the world.

Many materials included in the book note that the economic, political and defense might of the socialist community, and of the USSR above all, today is the chief force for preventing war. The international working and national liberation movements, the developing countries, and the world movement of adherents of peace make a considerable contribution toward strengthening the peace.

Based on Lenin's behests and on the Peace Decree proclaimed by Soviet authorities back in the days of the Great October, Soviet foreign policy is a policy of vigorous defense of the peace and international security. It found fullest embodiment in the Peace Program adopted by the 24th CPSU Congress and in its organic continuation--the program developed by the 25th party congress for further struggle for peace and international cooperation and for the freedom and independence of nations.

The collection provides a deeply scientific substantiation to the general Leninist course of USSR foreign policy. It is a course for ensuring peaceful conditions of successful communist development in our country and for strengthening the unity, friendship and brotherhood of socialist countries. It is a course for all possible support to revolutionary liberation movements and for further development of the solidarity and cooperation with developing states. It is a course for establishment of peaceful coexistence with respect to states with different social systems and for ridding mankind of world nuclear missile war. Comrade Brezhnev points out that "such a course is the only correct one. Our people and an enormous majority of our planet's population fully approve it."

The consistent implementation of the peaceloving foreign policy of the CPSU and Soviet state led to a number of positive changes. There was an increase in the number of capitalist countries recognizing the principle of peaceful coexistence as the norm of relations among states with different social systems. There has been an activation of the process of relaxation of international tensions. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe became a major historical event. Some progress was achieved in Soviet-American relations and in relations with other capitalist countries.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union cannot fail to consider that imperialism remains the enemy of peace and security of nations. Therefore Soviet peaceloving policy is combined with constant readiness to offer a decisive rebuff to any aggressor who dares attack us.

The pages of the collection "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" represent unique annals of the heroic struggle and labor exploit of the Soviet people to defend the achievements of the Great October. Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev researches the very extensive experience of class struggle of workers in other countries as well. This experience irrefutably confirms the vitality of Lenin's proposition that the socialist state must show steadfast concern for strengthening its defenses and the combat might of its Army in order to preserve the people's revolutionary achievements. This is one of the principles of socialist revolution and the building of a new society.

In carrying out their historic purpose of selflessly defending the achievements of the revolution, the Soviet Armed Forces created by the Communist Party and Vladimir Il'ich Lenin have covered a legendary heroic path in 60 years and have covered their colors with unfading glory.

The works of Comrade Brezhnev provide an evaluation of the most important events of the Civil and Great Patriotic wars, reveal the sources of strength and invincibility of the Soviet state and USSR Armed Forces, and point out the paths of modern military organizational development.

The idea of the managing role of the Communist Party in military organizational development both during the war years and the years of peace can be traced through the entire collection. The party links economic, political and military management as one and is the organizer of defense of the socialist homeland. Its management of the Armed Forces and a strengthening of the role and influence of party organizations in the Army and Navy represent the primary basis of military organizational development. Guided by the all-conquering teaching of Marxism-Leninism, the party devotes unwavering attention to increasing its organizing and directing influence on the entire life and activity of the Armed Forces, rallying personnel about the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet government, strengthening the unity of the Army and people, and bringing up military personnel in a spirit of patriotism, internationalism, combat cooperation with armies of socialist countries, and high readiness for a crushing rebuff to any aggressor.

There is essentially no area in military organizational development where the party's guiding influence is not displayed. The CPSU CC's managers also carry out a day-to-day lively intercourse with Armed Forces personnel. A vivid example of this is last year's trip by Comrade Brezhnev through parts of Siberia and the Far East, his meetings with Soviet soldiers, his speeches to them, and his presence at troop and naval exercises.

The guiding and managing role of the CPSU in leadership of the Armed Forces rises even more under conditions of developed socialism. The Soviet Army is

a special type of Army. It is organized so that its very existence, development and combat effectiveness are inconceivable without an increase in the party's managing role. This is the immutable law of its life.

The growth in the CPSU's management role in the Armed Forces was caused by the very same reasons as in the state as a whole. It cannot be otherwise. Our Army and Navy are an inalienable element of the social life of developed socialist society. Not only economic and sociopolitical problems are resolved in the course of building communism, but also tasks of armed defense against imperialist encroachments. At the same time, the increase in the party's role in military organizational development also is determined by features of Armed Forces development at the present stage.

These features include above all the complexity and contradictory nature of the international situation and the presence of military danger and immediate threat of imperialist attack on the USSR and countries of the socialist community. The contemporary international situation requires the Soviet people to display high vigilance and forces them to strengthen the might and combat readiness of the Armed Forces constantly. Consequently, it is necessary to have the most careful attention to military organizational development on the party of the CPSU. Basing themselves on a detailed Marxist-Leninist analysis and on a comprehensive consideration of the trends and prospects of development of political, economic and military forces in the world arena, the party, Central Committee and CPSU CC Politburo are taking timely and constructive measures aimed at relaxing the international situation and at the same time are concerning themselves with strengthening the country's defenses and strengthening management of the Armed Forces.

The increase in the CPSU's management role in the Armed Forces is a command of the times. It manifests itself naturally in all spheres of the party's defense activities: in strengthening the economic, scientific-technical and sociopolitical foundations of our defense might, in further improving the Army and Navy, and in coordinating military efforts with other socialist countries.

Relying on the organic link of achievements of the scientific-technical revolution with advantages of developed socialism, the party has elaborated and is implementing an economic strategy and program of social transformations in the interests of building communism. Their realization also assures a reliable defensive capability of the Soviet state. The CPSU is guided daily by Lenin's statement on the dialectical unity of economic, scientific-technical, moral-political and military potentials as the basic components of the state's defensive might.

Materials in the collection devote an exceptionally great amount of attention to the economic potential of our socialist homeland. Economics is the foundation for building a communist society. Successes in economic development allow us to resolve the primary social tasks and provide for an increase in the standard of living of Soviet citizens. At the same time, an uplift in the economy also determines the country's defensive might.

Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev also takes note of the great significance of scientific-technical potential. A number of his speeches and articles state that science and technology play an ever-increasing role in improving the material and technical basis of our defense, weapons, and military equipment; in raising the level of personnel training; and in developing methods and forms of armed warfare.

The creation of powerful weapons by Soviet science and technology put an end to the nuclear monopoly of imperialism and made the defense of the Soviet state indestructible. Thanks to concern by the party and people and as a result of fundamental qualitative transformations, our Armed Forces are at the level of modern requirements in their technical outfitting, organizational structure, and system of control and support.

Attention is directed repeatedly in the pages of the book to the great importance of our state's moral-political potential. Comrade Brezhnev states that "all of us realize the great importance of the country's defense and economic potential. There is no less significance in the moral-political condition of society or the spiritual and moral aspect of the people, on which . . . the firmness of defenses also largely depends" (pp 268-269).

Using examples of fighting at Malaya Zemlya, Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev tells about the spiritual strength of Soviet citizens and the height of their morale during the Great Patriotic War. "When we now recall, a third of a century later, what fell to the lot of the fighting men, commanders and political workers of our Army, we sometimes cannot even believe that all this took place and that it was possible to endure this. But we did endure. Everyone endured, went through everything, won out and defeated the fascists" (p 559).

The collection's materials reveal with exhaustive completeness the primary directions in shaping the country's firm moral-political potential at the modern stage. The most important of these is the party's concern for communist indoctrination of the Soviet people and for its ideological-political work. Comrade Brezhnev notes that the heart of this work is to shape a communist outlook in the broad masses of workers.

Thanks to the CPSU's tireless work, Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism became the profound conviction and standard of behavior for millions on millions of Soviet citizens of all nationalities. One of the most important party tasks has been and remains the establishment in the awareness of workers, and primarily of the young generation, ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, pride for the Land of Soviets and for our Motherland, and readiness to stand up in defense of the achievements of socialism.

The strictly military potential of the Soviet state's defensive might, and particularly the sociopolitical role of the socialist Army, is analyzed in detail from various aspects in the collection "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma."

The Soviet Armed Forces now have acquired the character of the whole people, having preserved in the new historic conditions the qualities which distinguished them from the first days of their origin--revolutionary spirit, allegiance to the working people, and internationalism. Our Army has lost completely its domestic function--the function of suppressing classes and social groups hostile to socialism. It now is performing only an external function of defending socialist achievements, the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. As stated in the USSR Constitution, it is the duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people to defend the socialist homeland reliably and to be in constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor.

Linked to the people by blood ties and being their favorite offspring, our Army lives one life with them. In addition to performing purely military missions, the Armed Forces of a socialist state cannot help but take part in the creative and indoctrinational work being conducted in the country as well. Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev noted in a report at the 25th CPSU Congress: "In speaking of indoctrinational work . . . we cannot help but dwell on the enormous role played by the Soviet Army in this matter. Young lads come into the soldier family without having gone through the school of life. But they return from the Army already as people who have gone through the school of self-control and discipline and who have received technical and professional knowledge and political training.

"Our Army has been brought up in a spirit of profound dedication to the socialist Motherland, to ideals of peace and internationalism and to ideals of the friendship of nations. This is the very thing which distinguishes the Soviet Army from bourgeois armies. This is why Soviet citizens love their Army and take pride in it" (p 435).

Our Army and Navy must be in a constant state of high combat readiness for successful performance of their primary, constitutional mission. The essence of combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces is revealed in detail in materials of the collection. Comrade Brezhnev defines it: "The enormous efforts and physical input of the people for outfitting the Army; the awareness, combat training and discipline of all service personnel; the art of command personnel in command and control and much more are concentrated in troop combat readiness as in a focus. In the final account this is the crown of troop combat expertise in peacetime and the key to victory in war" (p 137).

Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev singles out one component of combat readiness in particular such as efficiency, execution and discipline. He notes that now, when the deciding role in military affairs belongs primarily to collective forms of weapons and when success in employing them depends on the skilled, coordinated actions of many people, exceptional importance is acquired by high efficiency, constant composure and faultless execution of each person. Even isolated manifestations of negligence and lack of discipline on the part of military personnel may lead to serious consequences.

The book's material devotes much attention to the training of military cadres. Comrade Brezhnev's statements are permeated with great love for Army and Navy personnel, with pride in their achievements in the past, and with faith in their enormous capabilities in the present and future. He says that "our party and the Soviet state rightfully are proud of one of their supreme achievements, of the fact that now our Motherland has the necessary numbers of the best military personnel in the world" (p 104).

The collection emphasizes the importance of improving the workstyle of commanders, political entities and staffs, and the need for a high degree of good managment and precision. Exactingness toward people must be combined with constant concern for their training and indoctrination. Leonid Il'ich notes that our party proceeds from the Leninist teaching that no matter how high the Army's technical outfitting may be, the person who has mastered equipment to perfection remains the chief and deciding force in war. This is especially important now, in the age of nuclear missile weapons, when the fate of a war will be decided by people who have mastered the weapons and combat equipment, who are morally and physically fit, and who are utterly devoted to their Motherland, party and people.

The fundamental changes which have occurred in postwar years in the military-technical outfitting of troops and in the character and methods of combat actions sharply increased the demands placed on moral-political training of personnel. Comrade Brezhnev points out that "party-political work with personnel and their ideological conditioning always has been and remains a powerful weapon of our Army. The strength of this weapon was tested in the flame of battle. Even now it frightens our enemies" (p 139).

The recollections entitled "Malaya Zemlya" contained in the collection reveal the main directions of party-political work in a combat situation, its most effective forms and methods, and the great importance of a proper selection, training and placement of party cadres, creation of full-fledged party organizations, and assurance of the vanguard role of party members in performing combat missions.

The book devotes inspired, warm words to the military political worker and his role in combat. "Honor and glory to the sniper who has killed a handful of Hitlerites. Honor and glory to the company commander and fighting men of a company which has beaten off an attack and defended a line. If a division broke the enemy defenses and liberated a populated point, the commander's name was noted in the order of the Supreme Commander. But there was also great credit to the political worker who armed the fighting men ideologically, strengthened in them a great feeling of love for the Motherland, instilled belief in their abilities and inspired them for an exploit" (p 566).

Personal example is a necessary condition of the authority of a political worker. This book notes that it is important for people to know and see that in a difficult moment the one who was calling on them to hold out will be next to them, will remain with them and will go ahead of them with gun in

hand. It follows that the political worker's chief weapon is a fervent party word reinforced by action--personal example in combat. This is why political workers became the heart of the Armed Forces (see p 567). Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev was just such a political worker during the war years.

In developing Leninist ideas on the need for one-man command in the Army, Comrade Brezhnev points out the fact that the party has taken and is taking the position of its comprehensive, constant reinforcement. He notes here that one-man command in the Soviet Armed Forces is built on a party basis and that participation in party-political work is an inalienable part of the Soviet officer's work. There must be a unity of will and actions in the Soviet Army as nowhere else.

Speaking at the critique of the Dvina Troop Maneuvers, Comrade Brezhnev noted in particular that there exists a firm military and party friendship in the midst of our military cadres where commanders and political workers act as one, the political worker helps the commander, and the commander values and relies on the political worker. Our great strength and the strength and monolithic nature of our Army lie in this unity and friendship.

The collection's pages are permeated with firm assurance that the Soviet Armed Forces are capable of honorably performing their assigned important missions of defending socialist achievements. Comrade Brezhnev said at the 25th CPSU Congress that "the Soviet people can be sure that the fruits of their creative labor are under reliable protection" (p 437).

The book "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" examines the military-political cooperation of countries of socialism thoroughly and comprehensively. Comrade Brezhnev points out that the socialist community represents a new socio-historical commonality of states and nations. Countries of socialism cooperate among themselves exceptionally productively in all spheres of social life--economic, political, ideological and cultural. In the face of the military danger created by aggressive intrigues of imperialism and other enemies of peace, the socialist states have been forced to take necessary steps for collective assurance of their security as well and for maintaining constant, high defensive capabilities.

The forming of a military defensive alliance--the Warsaw Pact Organization--was a forced act by European countries of socialism. Comrade Brezhnev emphasizes that "we took this step for one purpose--to prevent a new war from breaking out. It was a retaliatory measure to aggressive preparations by NATO and to attempts to speak with us in the language of force" (p 279).

The Warsaw Pact and its military organization carry out a reliable, collective defense of countries of the socialist community, their state interests, territorial integrity and sovereignty. The socialist countries are conducting a peaceloving foreign policy based on the principle of proletarian internationalism and the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

In the unanimous declaration of the Moscow Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Pact Nations held in November of last year, a concrete program for curtailing the arms race and for a transition to disarmament was again advanced before the West. To this date, however, NATO leaders have not responded to the constructive proposals of the socialist states. Moreover, countries of the Atlantic Alliance are increasing their military budgets and expanding even more the practical implementation of a long-term program of armaments adopted at the Washington session of the NATO Council.

As long as the NATO alliance is preserved and militaristic reactionary circles conduct the arms race, our country and other fraternal countries will reinforce their military-political alliance. Comrade Brezhnev declared: "We will not undertake to weaken our defenses in the face of the growing military might of imperialism, no matter what demagogic arguments are used to conceal the calls for this. This would have irreparable consequences for the cause of communism and for the cause of freedom and independence of nations."

Bilateral treaties on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with which the Soviet Union and states of the socialist community are interconnected also have served for many years to develop comprehensive cooperation of countries of socialism, including military-political cooperation. Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev provides a comprehensive evaluation of practically each such treaty, viewing them as an important supplement to the collective Warsaw Pact.

The works of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev included in this book contain an enormous charge of historical optimism and profound assurance of the invincible strength of the socialist system, capable of providing reliable protection to the revolutionary achievements of USSR nations and nations of all fraternal countries if imperialism should unleash a war in defiance of reason. Comrade Brezhnev notes that "a defensive potential has been created and is being maintained through the joint efforts of Warsaw Pact nations so that any attempt by imperialism to settle with socialism through military force is doomed to crushing failure ahead of time" (p 482).

The theoretical generalizations and practical conclusions drawn by Comrade Brezhnev on the basis of experience of the Great Patriotic War and organizational development of the Armed Forces in the postwar period take in a very wide range of problems of military affairs. Everything of greatest importance which characterizes the theory, history and contemporary practice of Soviet military organizational development, the essence of party-political work in the Army and Navy, and the content, goals and ways of their further improvement is reflected vividly in the collection.

It is the urgent task of all our military cadres to gain a deep understanding of the very rich and exceptionally valuable conclusions, advice and recommendations contained in works by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and to make practical use of them in managing the troops and in training and indoctrinating personnel.

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MEDICAL CARE OF SERVICEMEN DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 79 signed to press 7 May 79 pp 28-34

[Article by Col Gen Med Serv F. Komarov, chief of Central Military Medical Directorate of USSR Ministry of Defense: "Guarding the Health of Servicemen"]

[Text] While implementing the Peace Program consistently and purposefully as elaborated by the 24th CPSU Congress and developed by the 25th, the Communist Party and Soviet government meanwhile are giving constant attention to strengthening the country's defenses. The 25th congress emphasized that our party will do everything to ensure that the glorious Armed Forces of the Soviet Union continue to possess all necessary means for performing their important mission of being guardian over the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the bulwark of universal peace.

The All-Army Conference for Improving Troop Life held in December 1977 was graphic proof of the concern shown by the Communist Party and Soviet government about the Motherland's defenders. It provided a thorough analysis of the status of material-and-personal and medical support of Army and Navy personnel and it outlined ways for further improving the work of rear services. The All-Army Conference played an important part in improving the everyday life of Soviet military personnel and raising the effectiveness of medical support.

Medical personnel of the Army and Navy accomplish a vast range of missions involving the preservation and strengthening of health, reduction of the rate of sickness and an improvement in conditions of military labor and life of the servicemen. They are improving medical support persistently, purposefully and consistently and stand vigilantly on guard over the health of service personnel. Medical units and establishments are outfitted with modern appartus permitting new and highly effective therapeutic and diagnostic methods to be assimilated and placed in practice. The knowledge and professional training of medical personnel is being improved constantly and the selection, placement and indoctrination of cadres is being improved.

It must be said that missions facing the medical service are becoming more complex depending on the increase in the level of technical outfitting of the Armed Forces, an improvement in combat equipment and weapons, and the introduction of the latest achievements of radio technology, electronics and automatics into military affairs. The means and methods of waging modern warfare and the altered conditions of military labor demand high moral-psychological qualities and outstanding health of service personnel. It is an important element of high troop combat readiness. The role of the troop medical service rises and higher demands are placed on the organization of medical support in this regard. The work of medical personnel today aimed at preserving and strengthening servicemen's health cannot be limited to traditional therapeutic and preventive measures. Now, for successful support of troop combat training, life and everyday routine, they must have a thorough knowledge of all aspects of the work of personnel of a particular combat arm, the character and features of service, and the degree the body is affected by the environment, exercises and deployments--all the elements and factors determining a soldier's physical and psychological level and his state of health. Only by possessing comprehensive and sufficiently complete data and giving timely and proper consideration to the dynamics of these processes is it possible to take effective steps to improve military working conditions, to prevent illnesses and to carry out effective medical support of personnel.

The preventive direction of Soviet military medicine, as of all public health as a whole, is a distinguishing feature. It is for this reason that the struggle for improving soldiers' working conditions, medical supervision over their state of health and prevention of the most widespread illnesses always have occupied and continue to occupy the most important place in the practical endeavor of medical personnel. Great importance is attached to increasing the quality and effectiveness of preventive measures and to their strict and precise planning.

Early detection of initial changes in the state of health of service personnel plays an important role in the organization of troop medical support. To single them out in good time, to perceive the slightest disruptions in the body's activity which still have not become obvious or customary symptoms, and to perform appropriate therapeutic and sanitation work means to prevent illness and preserve the soldier's health and combat effectiveness.

Accomplishment of missions involved with concern for the personnel's health and prevention of illnesses requires a high degree of professional training of all medical personnel, and troop physicians above all, and outfitting of the medical service with contemporary gear and equipment. Special requirements are placed on the troop medical service. It is the center of therapeutic and preventive work among the troops. Continuous medical supervision is exercised here over combat training and servicemen's rest. A complex of preventive and sanitation measures aimed at preserving and strengthening the soldiers' health is carried out in practice. The troop physician is first to encounter a patient and often it is he who begins and

ends the patient's treatment. It is understandable that the condition of troop medical support as a whole depends largely on the level and organization of preventive and therapeutic-diagnostic work at the troop level of the medical service.

Demands placed on the troop medical service have grown considerably and will continue to grow. There is an increasingly current need for a substantial improvement in its work, a rise in the level of professional training of medical personnel, and broad introduction of contemporary medical equipment and apparatus.

In resolving this problem we must be guided by the decree of the CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers "On Measures for Further Improvement of Public Health," which defines precisely the ways for improving medical support to Soviet citizens. The decree's demands also relate wholly and fully to us, the military medical personnel, and obligate us to work more purposefully and effectively and accomplish the missions assigned us with high quality.

Much is being done in the Armed Forces to improve and better the work of the troop level of the medical service; to raise the level of professional training of troop physicians, medical assistants and nurses; and to introduce modern medical achievements into their working practice. Issues involving an intensification of this work were discussed thoroughly and comprehensively at association conferences with the participation of chiefs of medical service of units, combined units, military districts, groups of forces and fleets, by chief and leading medical specialists, by professors and instructors of the Military Medical Academy imeni S. M. Kirov, and by heads of the Central Military Medical Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Recommendations were developed on the basis of the experience of foremost medical units and subunits for improving therapeutic-preventive and sanitation work. The scope and content of the troop physician's activities and ways to increase the effectiveness and quality of diagnostics and treatment were defined. Shortcomings were singled out in the work of the troop medical service, their reasons were revealed and specific steps outlined for their elimination.

The faculty of the Military Medical Academy imeni Kirov is making a great contribution toward resolving problems involving an improvement in the work of the troop echelon of the medical service. The Academy's scientists are participating actively in the preparation and comprehensive development of instructional methods and reference literature for troop physicians which takes fullest account of the missions facing them and the demands of modern medical science. The scientists also are showing great concern for improving the process of training young military physicians. The professors and instructors of the Academy and of military medical faculties under medical institutes realize that the high qualification of troop physicians and their military, ideological-political and moral-psychological training always has been and remains the deciding condition for further improvement and bettering of the work of the troop echelon of the medical service. In organizing

their work they proceed from an assumption that every graduate of a military medical training institution must be prepared from his first days in a unit to perform official duties to the full extent.

I would like to mention in more detail those professional, political and moral qualities which the troop physician must possess. As already has been noted, great and varied duties are placed on him. The troop physician is a plenipotentiary of the military medical service on its most forward line. He essentially organizes and implements in practice the entire complex of sanitation, preventive and therapeutic-diagnostic measures in a unit. In him the command element sees a qualified assistant in the solution to many problems relating to various aspects of operational combat activities of troops and the life and routine of personnel.

I would like to make particular mention of the importance of the troop physician's authority. The higher this authority, then the more the physician is trusted, the more open patients are with him, and the more successfully he will be able to accomplish all missions assigned him. But as we know, authority does not come of itself. It is won by serious work, profound and comprehensive professional and political knowledge, erudition, and an ability to find contact with people and influence them.

By the nature of his work, the troop physician has occasion to come in constant contact with various categories of personnel in the unit not only as a specialist, but also as an officer; to establish proper businesslike relations; and to display principle, persistence and consistency in solving various problems of medical support. This naturally requires him to have a high level of culture, a broad outlook, a thorough knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory, ideological maturity, an understanding of his role and place in the life of the unit, and precise knowledge of his duties and rights and of the duties and rights of other officials given responsibility for preserving the health of service personnel. Or take the ship's doctor. His role and importance have grown immeasurably now, when ships depart for the ocean expanses for a long period of time. He also has to be well trained in matters of naval hygiene and epidemiology and know the features of giving medical assistance aboard ships of different classes. The physician is required to have a knowledge of ship design and modern combat equipment as well as the ability to make an independent decision in a difficult situation. Only in this instance can he properly organize medical support to the crew on a long deployment.

In describing a particular troop or ship's doctor, we often forget to mention his attitude toward people, his sensitiveness, benevolence, tact and his ability to dispose a patient toward himself and cause him to be frank. Meanwhile, there is no real physician, nor can there be one, without these qualities. Without these qualities he can never achieve authority or success in his work.

Strictly speaking, sensitiveness, tact, benevolence and sincerity must be an inalienable quality of every medical worker, no matter what duties he performs. A patient sees in him both a friend and adviser to whom he can open his soul and with whom he can chat frankly. A kindly, compassionate word often becomes the most effective medicine.

Every troop physician is a manager and indoctrinator of the collective of unit medical personnel. The effectiveness of the medical service's work and the success of conducting preventive and therapeutic-sanitation measures depends on how skillfully and effectively he carries out these functions. It is apropos in this regard to recall the words of CPSU CC General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, which he uttered at the 25th CPSU Congress: "The modern manager must organically combine within himself a party spirit with deep competency, discipline with initiative and with a creative approach to the job." It is the duty of each military physician to instil in himself the qualities of a genuine manager who is a thoroughly trained, ideologically mature person of deep persuasion and principle.

A large number of military physicians who are graduates of the Military Medical Academy imeni S. M. Kirov and of military medical faculties of medical institutes are working today in the troop echelon of the medical service. They come to the troop units with sufficient specialized knowledge, extensive erudition and high moral qualities. The young physicians love their profession and are ready to work selflessly. Meanwhile, as a rule they lack practical experience and the skills and knowledge of organizing and conducting concrete practical activities at first, and they cannot always take account of the specific features of the branch of the Armed Forces or combat arm in which they have occasion to serve. The process of overcoming these difficulties and acquiring the necessary experience of entry into the officer collective, if that is the term, is greatly facilitated if the command element, political workers and the party organization take an active part in the development of the young medical officer. Well-arranged indoctrinational work leads to the rapid and productive development of yesterday's training institution graduate. In a short time he develops into an experienced, highly qualified, knowledgeable officer who accomplishes the missions assigned him successfully.

It is known that the unit physician performs much work involving the propaganda of a knowledge of sanitation, indoctrination of personnel in hygiene, and their training under a military medical training program. He is an active fighter for strengthening the personnel's physical fitness, preventing injury, and strict observance of the rules of personal hygiene. He is an active fighter for cleanliness and order in the barracks, mess halls and food depots. He is a propagandist of Marxist-Leninist ideology, communist morality and a high culture of everyday routine. For this reason an increase in each physician's political knowledge, propaganda expertise and social activeness, and the instilling of a desire to take a vigorous part in ideological indoctrination work with personnel has been and remains one of the important tasks. The command element, political entities and party organizations play a large part in accomplishing this mission.

A planned system for increasing physicians' qualifications is used widely in the Army and Navy. It permits deepening and renewing knowledge, being knowledgeable of the latest achievements of medical science, assimilating them and using them widely in practical work. Such forms and methods as therapeutic practice, duty in medical battalions and hospitals, seminars, conferences, primary specialization and advanced training of medical personnel are applied for improving medical knowledge. Unfortunately, however, they are not always used with sufficient completeness and vigor in outlying areas. There are instances of nonfulfillment of duty schedules, at times unit physicians are not sent for therapeutic practice for one reason or another, and so on. Measures for raising the qualifications of troop physicians must be accomplished more precisely and on a more planned basis, and schedules and plans must be strictly fulfilled.

A great deal of concern also is shown for increasing the ideological-political knowledge of medical workers and the propaganda expertise of physicians. Their political training is under the strict and unremitting supervision of commanders, political workers and party organizations. The best propagandists share experience with them. This provides positive results. But I would like to mention that every medical worker is obligated to display more initiative, creativeness and persistence in organizing independent professional and political training. Herein lies the key to success.

There are many medical subunits and units in the Army and Navy which are accomplishing missions of personnel medical support at a high level and are achieving stable and high results in sanitation and therapeutic-preventive work. And there are creative, persistent, competent people heading these collectives. For example, Sr Lt Med Serv S. Anufriyev successfully directs medical personnel of a unit. He is a graduate of the military medical faculty of Tomsk Medical Institute and holds the position of chief of the unit medical service. The young party member possesses good military training and thorough knowledge. He managed to direct the efforts of subordinates to resolve key problems. He organized medical support correctly and effectively and saw to it that the service he heads became exemplary.

Capt Med Serv K. Osadchiy also has been commended repeatedly by the command element. The officer puts much energy into introducing the latest achievements of medical science in the work practice of subordinates, and he is productively engaged in rationalization. His suggestions which have been developed and introduced on improving the organization of urgent medical assistance in the unit received the approval of district medical specialists.

Maj Med Serv V. Maksimov has taken part in medical support of many long ship deployments. He performed several cavitary surgery operations with a good outcome directly at sea under difficult conditions. In February 1979 the officer was awarded the "Badge of Honor" order for successful work of medical support to personnel.

It is noteworthy that all these comrades take an active part in ideological indoctrination work and devote much attention to political self-education.

Many other comrades can be mentioned whose experience merits study and dissemination. Very proper actions are being taken where the achievements of foremost troop physicians and the best military medical collectives are thoroughly analyzed and popularized. Their experience is widely used in the organization of socialist competition. This work must be improved in every possible way. The chiefs of medical service of combined units, military districts, fleets and groups of forces above all are obligated to concern themselves with propagandizing foremost experience. The district and fleet press and the VOYENNO-MEDITSINSKIY ZHURNAL play an active part in solving this problem.

The effectiveness of the medical service's work depends to a significant extent on how well it is outfitted with the necessary apparatus, instruments and tools. Our therapeutic institutions possess sophisticated apparatus, the latest instruments and highly effective drugs. But a rise in the level of technical outfitting of the troop medical service also generates a need for accelerated mastery of new apparatus and equipment, for developing practical skills of using it and for the broad application of therapeutic-diagnostic work in practice. The solution to this problem depends to a significant extent on the level of management of troop physicians' training. This management must be continually improved. It must become purposeful, effective, have a scientific substantiation and be efficient.

Success in performing the major difficult missions assigned to the troop medical service also depends largely on the conditions under which physicians, medical specialists and nurses have to work. A considerable number of medical stations in the Army and Navy are located in standard buildings with good conditions for performing therapeutic-diagnostic work. A calm and cozy atmosphere for patients is created in hospitals. At the same time there are still many medical stations and hospitals which also are situated in buildings which are not adapted or not suitable for these purposes, which seriously hinders the organization and conduct of qualitative and effective prophylactic and therapeutic-diagnostic activities. And although considerable funds are being allocated for improving the location of medical stations, hospitals and medical battalions and for carrying out capital construction and repairs of the buildings they occupy, matters are improving slowly. The task is to make use of these funds fully and with maximum effectiveness and attain high quality in construction, reconstruction and repair of existing buildings and their outfitting with standard furniture and medical property. Success in accomplishing this mission depends not only on the medical service, but also on the command element, political entities and rear services.

There is a broad range of problems involving a further improvement in the work of the troop medical service, an improvement in its outfitting, and an increase in the professional knowledge and qualifications of physicians. But

these problems must be resolved efficiently. In so doing, it must not be forgotten for a moment that this concerns the strengthening and preservation of the health of Army and Navy personnel. It is from this position that we must also approach the elimination of deficiencies which are present in the organization of the medical personnel's work. For example, some troop physicians perform insufficiently qualified examinations of personnel, do not make full use of the entire arsenal of modern diagnostic and therapeutic means in so doing, and allow mistakes and omissions in prophylactic and anti-epidemic work. Much has to be done to improve the work of medical commissions which select students and cadets for military educational institutions. The military medical service management is taking account of this and is taking necessary steps to eliminate the omissions and create conditions precluding their repetition. Workers of the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Military Medical Directorate and of medical departments of groups of forces, military districts and fleets are attempting to perform a detailed and comprehensive study and analysis of the work of troop physicians. They are showing concern for their training and are passing on their own abundant experience to them in the outlying areas.

But it must be said that the further improvement in the work of the medical service also depends largely on the attention given it by the command element, political entities and rear services, and on their participation in resolving problems involving a strengthening of servicemen's health, a bettering of military working conditions, and the organization of messing, water supply, everyday routine and rest of personnel. It is generally known that any violation of sanitary-hygienic norms and requirements in the organization of servicemen's work and everyday life, in the technology of food preparation, or in water supply may involve serious consequences including even the outbreak of mass illnesses. Therefore every violation must receive the appropriate evaluation not only on the part of medical personnel, but also the command element and all officials responsible for organization of operational training activity and everyday troop life and rest.

Military medical service personnel show high responsibility in accomplishing tasks of further improving medical support to troops and naval forces. They realize full well that all their work is aimed at preserving and strengthening the health of Soviet service personnel and at a further increase in the combat might of our glorious Armed Forces.

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METHODS OF IMPROVING LAW AND ORDER DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 79 signed to press 7 May 79 pp 35-41

[Article by Lt Gen Justice V. Novikov, first deputy chief military procurator: "Important Means for Strengthening Legality and Law and Order"*]

[Text] V. I. Lenin, founder of the Communist Party and Soviet state, attached exceptional importance to revolutionary legality in the origin, strengthening and development of socialist social relationships. He emphasized that "by passing laws which go to meet the aspirations and hopes of broad popular masses, the new power is placing milestones along the path of development of new forms of life" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XXXV, 56). Vladimir Il'ich saw in the general obligatory nature of Soviet laws, in their strict observance, in their steadfast execution by all, and in the inseparable link of legality with democracy, discipline and culture of people a most important condition for implementing party policy and a guarantee of economic and political successes in socialist development and the strengthening of our state.

In following the teaching of the great Lenin, the Communist Party constantly devoted and continues to devote great attention to assuring socialist legality and law and order as the foundations of normal life of Soviet society and as a guarantee of successful implementation of plans for building communism. Socialist legality is the fundamental principle of state management of society, an expression of the will of the Soviet people, and organization of social relationships in the interests of communist development. It stands on guard over the achievements of socialism and the rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens.

The party's Leninist policy in this area found precise legislative expression and consolidation in the new USSR Constitution. The Fundamental Law of the

*The article is recommended for use in the system of command training in studying the topic "Organization, Forms and Methods of Work for Further Strengthening of Socialist Legality, Law and Order, and Discipline Among the Troops and in the Fleets."

society of developed socialism generalized the party's enormous work of improving the law and implementing its requirements. It established the following: The Soviet state and all its entities operate on the basis of socialist legality and ensure the protection of law and order, the interests of society and the rights and freedoms of citizens. State and social organizations and officials are obligated to observe the USSR Constitution and all Soviet laws. USSR citizens possess the entire gamut of socio-economic, political and personal rights and freedoms, exercise of which is inseparable from their fulfillment of their duties to society and the state.

The Fundamental Law of our state of the whole people views the strengthening of the legal basis of state and public life as a most important element of the further development of socialist democracy and development of the political system of Soviet society. In a speech to electors of the Baumanskiy

Electoral District of Moscow, CPSU CC General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev spoke about socialist legality and stressed: "The well-conceived system of laws plus their strict execution is legality and it is law and order without which the socialist way of life and socialist democracy are inconceivable."

The strictest observance of the USSR Constitution, other laws, military regulations, the military oath, orders of the USSR Minister of Defense, and all legal documents regulating various aspects of military service represent the immutable norm of daily life and work of Army and Navy personnel and a reliable foundation for the normal functioning of the entire military organism. The conscientious execution of legal instructions by every military control entity, every commander, every chief and every soldier is of exceptionally great importance in ensuring high efficiency, cohesiveness and discipline of the military collective and its exemplary performance of duty in maintaining constant combat readiness at the level demanded by the USSR Constitution.

Life, daily practice, and the foremost experience of military collectives convince us over and over again that the persuasion and communist indoctrination of personnel, a component of which is legal indoctrination, serves as the primary method for strengthening legality and discipline in the unit, in the subunit or aboard the ship. Primary efforts in legal indoctrination work are concentrated on a detailed explanation to personnel of the party's Leninist ideas and policies in the area of strengthening socialist legality, provisions of the USSR Constitution, laws on military service, the military oath and military regulations. Special attention is given to demonstrating the importance of each serviceman's conscientious performance of his sacred duty of defending the socialist homeland, of the obligation to safeguard and strengthen socialist ownership, and of all other constitutional obligations.

The primary goal of legal indoctrination is to convert a knowledge of the laws and ideas of socialist law into an active life position, into the

personal conviction of each serviceman and into that daily conduct which corresponds to the requirements of legislation and the orders of commanders and chiefs. Legal indoctrination is called upon to teach military personnel to execute all laws on the Red Army and maintain discipline therein in every possible way: in Lenin's words, not out of fear, but out of conscience. It must help them develop respect for military law and order and to be strengthened in the understanding of its reasonableness and enormous state significance, in intolerance for deviations from laws, regulations and orders, and in the need for active struggle against violations of the law and antisocial acts.

Legal indoctrination in the Armed Forces is performed on the basis of party and government decisions and in conformity with orders and directives of the USSR Minister of Defense and Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. The organizational basis of this purposeful work is the plan of activities on legal indoctrination of military personnel, which obligates all commanders, political entities, military lawyers, military press entities and cultural enlightenment establishments to give a detailed explanation of Leninist ideas on the Soviet state and law; to elevate the role and responsibility of cadres and all service personnel for strict observance and execution of the USSR Constitution, Soviet laws, the military oath and regulations; and to increase vigilance and combat readiness. There must be assurance of a close unity of ideological-political, military, moral and legal indoctrination with consideration of the features of each unit and ship, different categories of service personnel, as well as the status of legality and discipline.

Soviet law, based on Marxist-Leninist ideology, is one of the forms of expression and implementation of party and state policy. It also contains a juridical consolidation of the standard of communist morality and rules for performing military service. Legal instructions and requirements are in accordance with the moral awareness of Soviet citizens, are approved by them and are perceived as a command of our society. Soviet Armed Forces regulations represent a code not only of legal norms of behavior, but of moral norms of behavior as well. They obligate each serviceman to observe Soviet laws and the military oath sacredly and inviolably, to be honest and truthful, to cherish troop comradeship, and not be sparing of one's energy or life itself in performing military duty.

The work of legal indoctrination of personnel is being directed constantly by military councils; political directorates of branches of the Armed Forces, military districts, groups of forces and fleets; and by the command element and political entities of combined units and units. Many management officials take an active part in legal work, but responsibility is placed fully on the commander for its status in the unit, aboard ship and in the subunit. The deputy commander for political affairs is directly responsible for the organization and conduct of legal indoctrination activities.

A businesslike, interested attitude toward legal indoctrination and a desire to achieve its high quality and effectiveness are typical of the overwhelming majority of commanders, political workers and military lawyers. Relying on party and Komsomol organizations, they persistently maintain firm regulation order and give explanations to the soldiers of the norms of Soviet military legislation imaginatively and at a high level.

For example, positive experience of legal indoctrination has been gained in the triple-order guards surface-to-air missile regiment of the Order of Lenin Moscow Air Defense District where Gds Maj V. Vodop'yanov is a political worker. Legal indoctrination work here is combined with the organization of the servicemen's entire life, everyday routine and work on the basis of laws and military regulations. There is a systematic analysis of the status of discipline in subunits and of commanders' disciplinary practice. There is strict supervision and a check of execution of orders and instructions. Special attention is given to the precise organization and vigilant performance of combat watch and fulfillment of socialist pledges made by the soldiers. Skillful use is made here also of such effective forms as topical evenings, film lecture evenings, and evenings of questions and answers along with lectures, briefings and reports in propagandizing the USSR Constitution, laws and military regulations. Legal knowledge reading rooms have been well arranged in all subunits. A group of briefers under the regimental political department and military lawyers make a specific contribution toward legal indoctrination. Party and Komsomol organizations and military collectives take an active part in prevention of infractions of the law. Active preventive work is conducted within a single complex of measures for training and indoctrinating personnel, which produces the most positive results, reflected primarily in the soldiers' conscientious and vigilant performance of combat watch and in faultless execution of other obligations of military service.

The legal indoctrination of Army and Navy personnel is accomplished in the process of practical implementation of the demands of Soviet laws, military regulations, directions, manuals, orders and instructions. A superficial knowledge of statutes is the primary cause of many deviations from the tenor of military life and regulation norms of behavior, and for other negative phenomena. In order to discharge laws and regulations conscientiously and strictly, one must of course know them well, understand their essence and content, and be filled with deep respect for them. Such knowledge is especially needed by commanders and chiefs inasmuch as they play the deciding role in supporting military law and order. The USSR Constitution and regulations obligate them to be a model of observance of the laws, to maintain firm regulation order, to eliminate any infractions in good time, and to take steps to prevent them.

One-man commanders bear personal responsibility for the organization of the personnel's entire service and everyday routine in strict conformity with laws and regulations and for the firm and consistent implementation of party and state policies in the field of strengthening legality, discipline and

military law and order. They not only themselves execute and apply norms of the law in practical work, but also are obligated to constantly see to their strict execution by all subordinates.

The right to order, command and make use of personal authority is a very responsible right. Written and verbal orders as well as instructions issued by the commanders concern the most varied aspects of combat and political training, the organization of service, strengthening of discipline, indoctrination of personnel, the safekeeping of weapons, combat equipment, and monetary and physical assets, and many other issues of military service. This obligates them to have precise knowledge not only of military legislation, but also of administrative, labor, criminal and other legislation. A profound knowledge of laws and of official rights and duties on the part of officers and their ability to use them properly in the interests of service help establish respect for the laws in subordinates' awareness and conduct and help maintain a high level of discipline and military law and order.

Officers acquire legal knowledge in higher military educational institutions in studying the course "Foundations of Soviet Law." Classes in the system of Marxist-Leninist and command training, in evening universities of Marxism-Leninism, in law schools and lecture groups, as well as lectures, reports, practical science conferences, seminars and interviews are effective forms for expanding their juridical conversancy and for ensuring proper application of law in their practical work. Officers with legal training are widely used to conduct these activities. Each officer unquestionably is obligated to be concerned himself primarily with increasing his own legal culture and to make constant use of specialized literature where various legal matters are covered rather completely and legislative acts are commented on. Material published in the journals SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA ZAKONNOST', CHELOVEK I ZAKON, SOVETSKAYA YUSTITSIYA and other periodicals may also be of great help in independent study of the laws.

Political classes and political briefings are widely used for the study of Soviet legislation by Armed Forces personnel. They are more effective in those units and subunits where group instructors and political briefers are given the necessary scientific methods assistance and where seminars, courses and instructional classes are held with them using military lawyers.

Well prepared film lecture evenings and mornings, and evenings of questions and answers enjoy great popularity among service personnel. The most widespread topics to which they are devoted include "The USSR Constitution--Fundamental Law of the Land of Soviets," "Military regulations are the law of life for Soviet soldiers," "The strength of Soviet soldiers lies in troop comradeship and friendship," "Performance of combat watch is the performance of a combat mission of special state importance," "A red light to automobile accidents," "Do battle against drunkenness" and "Serve the Motherland faithfully."

Practice shows that film lecture evenings and topical evenings achieve greater effectiveness when they are preceded by thorough preparations under a plan elaborated by commanders and political workers with the participation of lawyers. It is advisable to use the following films in holding the evening gatherings: "A Bitter Lesson," "How Much Vodka Costs," "The Same as I," "Behind a Dangerous Trait" and others made with the participation of the Main Military Procurator's Office and the Military Tribunal Directorate.

Every possible effort should be made to include clubs and libraries in the work of organizing and conducting legal propaganda. It is on this basis that it is most convenient to prepare and conduct various topical evenings; create special displays, visual aids, book exhibits, and journal and newspaper selections on law; and prepare material for local radio broadcasts. Constant concern must be shown to ensure that there is sufficient literature on moral-legal matters in unit, subunit and ship libraries.

Almost every barracks and every ship now has legal knowledge reading rooms which have become a component part in arranging Lenin rooms (cabins). As a rule, they have a small legal library which includes materials of the 25th CPSU Congress; the USSR Constitution; the Law on Universal Military Obligation; pamphlets with speeches by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 18th Komsomol Congress, at the November (1978) CPSU CC Plenum, to voters of the Baumanskiy Electoral District of Moscow on 2 March 1979, and at the 1st session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 9th Convocation; military regulations; various popular books; and an album of posters on Soviet law.

Party and Komsomol organizations act as irreplaceable assistants of commanders and political workers in conducting legal indoctrination work. They attach primary importance to ensuring the example is set by each of their members in fulfilling demands of laws, regulations and orders and in mobilizing coworkers for precise, faultless performance of military service; and also to forming public opinion around violators of military discipline. Party and Komsomol members explain soldiers' rights and obligations, popularize leaders of training and service, and work to prevent deviations from regulation requirements. Matters of increasing personal responsibility of party and Komsomol members for performance of official duties and prevention of infractions of the law often are discussed at party and Komsomol meetings, at bureau sessions and in the aktivs.

The objective process of the growing role of Army and Navy public opinion in strengthening military discipline and regulation order presents heightened demands on the subunit commander. He must be able to shape public opinion and indoctrinate personnel in a spirit of high mutual exactingness, a sense of principle in relationships, and irreconcilability toward violations of the laws and military regulations. To this end it is necessary to make active use of the resources and capabilities of military collectives, personnel meetings, comrades courts and all of the forms and methods of social pressure.

Commanders and political workers enjoy special respect and authority among subordinates when they set the personal example of strict and precise fulfillment of demands of laws, the military oath, regulations, written and verbal orders and the norms of communist morality and when their word does not deviate from their deed. The officer's personal example comprises that indoctrinational force which cannot be substituted for by textbooks, by moral admonitions or by a system of punishments and incentives. The success of a commander's work with subordinates depends to a decisive extent on how he knows his job, how he conducts himself and how he regards the fulfillment of demands of regulations and of written and verbal orders. The very same must be said about the role and importance of skilled disciplinary practice by the officer-indoctrinators. A positive appraisal of a soldier's deed and approval of his success in performing an official duty is reflected in a legal indoctrination measure such as a commendation. The commendation combines high exactingness toward a subordinate with deep respect for his dignity and with concern for him. This cannot help but inspire him for further success in combat and political training and in strengthening military discipline.

Skillfully arranged individual work is used to achieve good results in preventing violations of discipline and regulation order. Discussions are one of its important forms. Experienced organizers hold them unconstrainedly, with due tact and respect for the soldier's personal dignity and with consideration of his mood, need, inclinations and reasons for his conduct. This ensures the most productive indoctrinational influence.

V. I. Lenin pointed out that the struggle against violations of discipline "cannot be waged only by propaganda and agitation, only by organization of competition, or only by selection of organizers--it also has to be waged by coercion" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XXXVI, 197). We employ coercion in combination with indoctrination on the basis of persuasion. Only in this case can it be successful. Irreversibility of responsibility and a conviction that each violation of the law will be punished without fail forces negligent soldiers to carry out the demands of military regulations, instils a respect for the law in them and keeps them from evil deeds.

The commander or chief's correct application of his disciplinary authority based on a strict observance of laws and regulations is of great political and juridical importance and exerts a great indoctrinational and preventive influence on subordinates. All this obligates commanders and chiefs to have a detailed knowledge of the state of discipline in the subunit or unit, to combine skillfully measures of incentive and punishment in order to strengthen it, to take account of subordinates' individual features in so doing, and to study and increase continuously the effectiveness of his disciplinary practice and that of junior commanders.

Some sergeants and petty officers are not active enough in using the disciplinary rights granted them, assuming erroneously that it is primarily superior chiefs who must hold persons disciplinarily liable. Misdeeds of

some soldiers sometimes remain unaffected as a result of this. In such an atmosphere of impunity some commanders get the desire to "impose order" by antiregulation measures, which in itself is a very crude violation of discipline. It not only does not and cannot help strengthen it, but to the contrary, it undermines and weakens regulation order and generates new infractions of discipline.

Greatest success in legal indoctrination is achieved where there is a carefully conceived system for organizing service, everyday routine, training and rest of personnel, where there is precise supervision and where there is high command exactingness. It is not enough to know the laws and regulations or to persuade soldiers as to the need for their strict execution. Firm regulation order must be created, i.e., that atmosphere in which the Army and Navy organism can only exist and develop. It is the close unity of organizational and indoctrinational work on the part of commanders and political workers which ensures success.

Demands of the 25th Party Congress and of CPSU CC decrees on ideological matters and on improving legal indoctrination obligate commanders and political entities to study the status of this work and effectiveness of its various forms and methods, and to seek more effective ways for shaping socialist legal awareness in soldiers. Association practical science conferences in Kiev, Sverdlovsk, the Baku Air Defense District, and the Odessa, Carpathian and other military districts were devoted to a discussion of these current issues. The conferences pointed to the need for improving its quality as a whole in addition to defining the most effective forms and methods of legal indoctrination work. The conclusions and recommendations of these conferences obligate each commander to give primary attention to the legal indoctrination of personnel and to direct the energy and initiative of party and Komsomol activists and all propagandists of the law constantly into the necessary channel.

The legal indoctrination work of military justice entities also requires further improvement. It is their task to intensify the preventive and indoctrinational effect of legal practice and raise the quality of legal propaganda. It is particularly important to improve instructional methods work and give effective assistance to commanders and political workers in organizing and conducting legal indoctrination activities.

A matter of great importance for commanders, political entities, party and Komsomol organizations, military procurators and tribunals is their concerted work in light of the decree adopted by the party Central Committee "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work." Improvement of all legal indoctrinstion work in connection with the decree and the high activeness, initiative and creativeness of organizers of purposeful activities is the guarantee of assuring firm military discipline, firm regulation order and constant combat readiness of units, ships and subunits.

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INDOCTRINATION METHODS ABOARD MISSILE CRUISER DESCRIBED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 79 signed to press 7 May 79 pp 74-78

[Article by Capt-Lt N. Sinitsyn: "A Living Spring of Knowledge and Experience"]

[Text] What they say is true: Sailors are but visitors when they go ashore, and it is only at sea that they are in their element.

The missile cruiser Admiral Golovko is not a frequent visitor of its home port. It returns to its base for a short time, and then once again it sets out to sea on a difficult cruise. Out there, far away from native shores, the crew is tested on its combat proficiency, its ideological maturity, and its bravery and steadfastness during every mile of the cruise. In a recent training cruise the cruiser repelled a simulated air strike and an attack by missile boats, and it neutralized the efforts of an "enemy" submarine shadowing it. Then a crack shot with surface-to-air missiles destroyed a a low flying target. And then another precise missile strike.

It only seems that the ship appears the same following a long cruise as it did when it started. In fact, however, out there on the Mediterranean, the people grew and matured, and they acquired qualities inherent to true defenders of the motherland. Perhaps the main one of these qualities they acquired is responsibility. Every seaman is responsible for successful completion of the mission in his particular area. The demand upon the ship commander in this regard is especially high.

Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Il'ich Churikov has devoted a little less than a quarter of a century to the sea. He experienced his first long cruises in the Northern Fleet. In the Black Sea Fleet he experienced the hard naval school of a commander's development as chief assistant and then commander of a destroyer. Aboard the missile cruiser Admiral Golovko, where he has served continuously for 4 years now, he began as the commander's senior assistant. There was a lot of hard duty at this difficult post before he assumed full command on the bridge of a modern warship.

This short biographical sketch could hardly transmit all of the troubles, anxieties, and hard work of the past years. But is it any easier today? After all, he has a menacing weapon in his hands, a huge fighting collective is subordinated to him, and he must be not only an outstanding military specialist but also an artful educator, an apostle of the party's ideals, and an active implementer of its policies. Captain 1st Rank V. Churikov serves his commander's watch from early morning to late evening, and often at night. Such is the nature of his job, requiring his personal participation in many of the crew's affairs, and a total commitment of oneself.

The responsibilities carried by the commander of a modern ship are uncountable. But there is one which is not in the Naval Regulations, but which is nevertheless important in its own way. Captain 1st Rank V. Churikov is the leader of a Marxist-Leninist training group.

We hardly need prove that the practical successes enjoyed by officers in their work and in subordinate training and indoctrination are directly dependent on their own training level, their ideological maturity, and their ability to clearly envision, beyond the petty affairs of the day, the great goal in behalf of which the cruiser's crew is working. The work attains it full meaning only to an ideologically mature individual. Marxist-Leninist theory is called upon to help every student temper his ideals. It serves as a dependable reference point, a living spring of knowledge and experience. Officers learn to apply Marxist-Leninist methodology in their daily affairs, and to find the main link in the chain of events upon which the holiest of the holies--the ship's constant combat readiness--depends in the end.

The captain 1st rank speaks thoughtfully, without haste. One feels that the responsibilities of an unofficial propagandist and all of the troubles associated with these responsibilities fit his nature. There are maps spread beneath a glass top in the spacious commander's cabin in which we were conversing. Describing the organization of Marxist-Leninist training during a cruise and when standing at anchor, Churikov pointed out a barely noticeable spot in the north of the Mediterranean Sea.

"Here," he said, "I took my first steps as a group leader."

It was the commander's first long cruise. It was memorable to him for a number of reasons. Among them was the fact that it was during that cruise that he conducted his first seminar for the Marxist-Leninist training group. The results were not especially optimistic: Only two students appeared voluntarily; the rest had to be officially summoned. Why? He placed the main blame on himself. He failed to help the students prepare themselves better, and he was unable to start an interesting discussion or an exchange of opinions concerning the issues under discussion.

The commander gained proficiency as a propagandist from one lesson to the next. He very much wanted every topic studied to not only widen the outlook

of the students but also encourage their creativity in their daily affairs and elicit a desire to utilize the knowledge they acquired. He also had to apply some pressure on some students who attempted to "coast" through lessons, relying on knowledge they had picked up earlier and on old lesson summaries.

Officer L. Yankovskiy resisted the captain's efforts an especially great deal in those days. "During my career I have studied and summarized all of the recommended classical works. I feel that this is quite sufficient for successful training," he declared presumptiously to the group leader. The truth is, however, that it is impossible to function without constantly updating one's knowledge. The officer came to understand this in time. Today, Yankovskiy is a master of combat qualification, a competent indoctrinator of his subordinates, and an order-bearer. He is also an active participant of seminar lessons.

"At first it seemed to me," Churikov confessed, "that leading the group would mean taking myself away from my responsibilities as a commander. But the reverse turned out to be true."

The officer soon came to feel that his lessons with his students enriched him, helping him to understand the people, their character, and their psychology better. He discovered that leadership of the group helped him to see how Marxist-Leninist training affects the official and public political activities of his students, and how it broadens the range of his own educational work with officers. The commander became more and more convinced that he would not be able to become a true propagandist, an ideal mentor of the students without persistent independent training. He made it his rule to find the time to study the books or articles and enrich himself with new knowledge no matter how hard or full the day. He made it a habit to read Lenin's works, that inexhaustible source of wisdom. The officer does not simply read these works; instead, he ponders every line deeply; he analyzes, he compares, and he seeks advice for solution of today's problems.

The crew of the missile cruiser Admiral Golovko adopted the pledge of earning the "outstanding" title. To achieve this goal, the quality of the lessons had to be high and the effectiveness of the entire training process had to be raised. How was this to be done? A thoughtful reader would find the following idea in V. I. Lenin's works: The key to success lies in a correct work style, in consideration of the collective experience, in a good working atmosphere, and in thorough criticism and self-criticism.

The captain 1st rank spoke about the great leader's commandments and about how they could be implemented more fully in one of his lectures to the Marxist-Leninist training group. the students listened to him attentively. After all what the commander was proposing was in line with the desires of each of his subordinates. Moreover the discussion about how to find what is most important in the work, how to achieve visuality and comparability of results, how to achieve practical repitition of the experience of the leaders of the socialist competition, how to fight against self-satisfaction, and how to

maintain and reinforce combat readiness helped the students to understand more fully the treasurehouse of Lenin's ideas, and to evaluate their own work with the high standards demanded by these ideas. The words of the great leader have acquired graphical, concrete expression in our lives today. An understanding of this is precisely what the group leader was striving for.

Such, then, is Captain 1st Rank Churikov's style as a propagandist: No matter what the topic of his lecture, he necessarily presents instructive examples from the life and combat training of the personnel, and he recalls the missions which the cruiser's crew must complete.

A lecture is in a sense an introduction to independent work, the latter being the principal method of assimilation of Marxist-Leninist theory. V. I. Lenin emphasized that without a certain amount of independent work, no one could ever find the truth in a problem of any seriousness. The group leader penetrates into the details of preparations made by his students for a forthcoming seminar lesson, and he makes sure that every student would be able to work fruitfully. Sometimes it happens that there is not enough literature for all aboard the ship. At such times Captain 3d Rank A. Kravchenko, the group leader's assistant, distributes the literature and makes sure that the students circulate it among themselves in such a way as to permit adequate reading time. He also consults with the students on an individual basis, and he writes literature reviews.

Off-duty students study together in the officer mess-room during independent study hours. This has become the rule in the group. Everyone knows that they will be studying independently during certain days and hours. The group leader also prepares for his seminars together with the students. He discusses the essence of the problems being studied with individual students, and he checks their work with primary sources and other recommended literature.

He conducts such discussions especially frequently with officers who sometimes revealed deficiencies in their training. Take as an example Lieutenant I. Fadeyev. He had never developed firm habits in studying the primary sources. He was unable to reflect in his notes the principal idea of the works he read. Other students also suffered similar shortcomings. On consulting with the ship's propagandist, Churikov suggested that Captain-Lieutenant G. Sitnikov speak to the group. This officer is distinguished by the ability to thoughfully summarize the primary sources, and to extract from them all that may be beneficial to practical work and to successful service. With the help of the ship's propagandist, Sitnikov prepared a lecture. The comrades listened to him with great interest.

Seminars have especially great significance to t[illegible]t-Leninist education and ideological growth of officers. The commande[illegible]s for these seminars with special care. He feels that active discussion i[illegible] seminar means active thought, that the officers are not just retelling what they have read but are thinking about it aloud, stating their personal opinions, and reinforcing them

with references to the classicists of Marxism-Leninism. And of course they try to utilize the ideological wealth contained in these works to analyze the state of affairs in subordinate training and indoctrination.

As an example we can cite the seminar on the topic "V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Socialist Labor Collective. Pressing Problems in Formation and Unification of Military Collectives." At the end of the seminar its participants went away with a sense of satisfaction, ready to indoctrinate the seamen more actively. What made this result possible?

In order to impart a creative nature to the seminar the group leader wrote out an elaborate personal plan for preparing for and conducting the lesson. In it, the basic ideas were broken down into many points and even subpoints, and they were supplemented with excerpts from primary sources and from periodical articles on this topic. As required, the propagandist made the students aware of the study questions for the forthcoming seminar immediately after the lecture. Other topics intended for deeper discussion he left for the seminar. These question were intended to create a free atmosphere of discussion in which every officer would want to state his opinion and participate in collective discussion of the topic. The captain 1st rank carefully thought out the content of his introductory remarks, and he summarized them in his notebook. He tried to imagine the sort of questions the students may ask, and he thought about how to answer them. He wrote out a summary of his conclusion.

The propagandist also though about whom he would ask to prepare a report for the seminar. He decided on Officer V. Volk. Vladimir Vladimirovich works with his subordinates a great deal, and with a great deal of interest. It is no accident that the department he heads contains a friendly, unified collective. In it, all training missions and all socialist pledges receive outstanding grades. Of course fellow servicemen could not ignore the words of such a talented officer.

The ship commander talked with his student and suggested that he prepare a report. They worked together on the plan of his subsequent lecture, and they chose some of Lenin's references to collectivism and comradeship. They thought about how best to tie in Lenin's statements with the present, with the concrete affairs of the crew. Such objective assistance from his senior comrade helped the student to prepare a substantial report.

The group leader ordered his assistant, Captain 3d Rank A. Kravchenko, to prepare for the seminar as well. Working closely with the librarian and the projector operator, Aleksey Ivanovich prepared the visual aids, selected the film strips, and made sure that the mess-room was ready for the lesson.

Nor did the commander ignore the preparations made by the rest of the students in the group for the seminar. He suggested to them how they could reveal the basic traits of the Soviet military collective with concrete examples, how to demonstrate its fundamental difference from a bourgeois

military collective, and how to tie in the content of the topic more closely with the particular works by V. I. Lenin being studied at that time.

Churikov devoted special attention to those comrades who for some reason were unable to attend the lecture. He worked with them on an individual basis. Thus the commander suggested that Senior Lieutenant V. Volodin turn special attention to delving deeply into the proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress and the November (1978) CC CPSU Plenum, and he advised that he once again read through Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech to the electorate of the capital's Baumanskiy electiondistrict, and Leonid Il'ich's memoirs "The Little Land," "Resurrection," and "The Virgin Land." Volodin heeded the advice of his senior. His presentation during the seminar was profound and well substantiated.

The group has adopted the rule that whenever anyone takes the floor in a seminar, he must present thought-provoking material to the judgement of his comrades. He must not limit himself to reading a previously written text. He must speak in his own words, demonstrate the correctness of his strictly logical line of reasoning, and competently reinforce his ideas with statements from the classicists of Marxism-Leninism and examples from day-to-day life. When seminars are conducted in this way, no one remains indifferent; each person feels himself to be a participant of a creative process of collective thinking,and each student grows ideologically and spiritually.

There were many that wanted to speak in the seminar we are discussing here. Officer V. Volk's report elicited a lively discussion. Students S. Ivanchuk, A. Getta, A. Kravchenko, and others enthusiastically talked about the role of officers in unifying military collectives and forming an active life position in the soldiers. The commander was pleased that the students had made a deep study of the primary sources and other recommended literature, and that they were able to tie in theory with practice, with the missions of the ship.

Being a member of the party bureau and commander of the cruiser, Captain 1st Rank Churikov often seeks the advice of the ship's party organization secretary, Captain-Lieutenant V. Sinitskiy, and he orients the work of communists at insuring successful completion of training missions. He tactfully suggests the problems in the given stage of combat training upon which the main emphasis should be placed, and how best to orient the communists on their solution. He has initiated many discussions in party meetings and party office conferences on problems concerning officer Marxist-Leninist training. Naturally all of this produces the desired fruits. It is no accidents that the Marxist-Leninist training group led by the ship commander has earned outstanding grades in the last 3 years.

A knowledge of revolutionary theory and party policy, the CC CPSU decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" emphasizes, must transform in Soviet people into a conviction, into the

active life position of a steadfast champion of communism, into a guide for action. Ship officers reinforce their ideological maturity with concrete acts. All students in the group perform their official duties and bear their hard naval service selflessly, with maximum effort.

Today, as with all Soviet people, our seamen are focusing their attention on the decisions of the April (1979) CC CPSU Plenum and the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It was with a sense of satisfaction that the personnel of the cruiser learned that the highest organ of state rule in the country once again elected CC CPSU General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to be chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet unanimously and with great enthusiasm. Wholly approving the party's and government's wise Leninist domestic and foreign policy, naval seamen are declaring their desire to continue to maintain our country's defense capabilities at their peak, to keep combat readiness and discipline high, and to always be on guard.

The mooring lines were cast off, and the home berth dissolved in the morning mist. The crusier once again set out on a long cruise. Vladimir Il'ich Churikov peered ahead from the captain's bridge. He is guiding his subordinates on the course of faithful service to the fatherland.
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PLAN FOR INDOCTRINATION ON ARMED FORCES DEVELOPMENT OUTLINED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 79 singed to press 7 May 79 pp 79-86

[Article by Col V. Yermachenkov: "The USSR Armed Forces in the Years of Peaceful Socialist Construction"]

[Text] The objective of lessons on this topic is to give the students a clear impression of the development and growth of the Soviet Armed Forces in an important period of their history--from 1921 to June 1941, and to help the soldiers gain a deeper understanding of the significance of the Communist Party's multifaceted activities aimed at insuring the safety of the socialist fatherland in the face of the threat of a military invasion of the USSR.

Eight hours are devoted to the topic. It would be best to allocate this time as follows: 2 hours for lecture (narration), 2 hours for independent study, and 4 hours for a seminar (discussion).

Examination of the following problems is recommended in the lecture (narration): 1. Transition of the Soviet republic to a peacetime status and reorganization of the Red Army. 2. Growth of the battlepower of the army and navy during the prewar five-year plans. 3. The growing threat of military invasion of the USSR, and measures implemented by the Communist Party to strengthen the country's security.

It would be desirable to note in a brief introduction that the Soviet people are persistently implementing the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the July and November (1978) and April (1979) plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, and of the First Session, Ninth Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and that they are striving to achieve an honorable welcome for the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth. The heroic history of our motherland and its armed forces inspire them to new achievements in labor and military duty in the name of communism. The 1920's and 1930's make up an important period of the history of the armed forces. It was precisely during this time that Lenin's plan for developing socialism in our country was implemented.

The socioeconomic achievements of the prewar five-year plans and the ideological and political unity of Soviet society, forged in the course of socialist development, made it possible to insure the defense capabilities of the Soviet Union and improve its armed forces.

1. Transition of the Soviet Republic to a Peacetime Status and Reorganization of the Red Army

The victorious end of the Civil War strengthened the domestic and international position of the young Soviet state. The Soviets were now able to concentrate their principal efforts on economic and cultural development. They had to complete this task in an unimaginably difficult situation, being encircled by a hostile capitalist world. The poor productive capacities and low cultural level inherited from Czarist Russia, dominance of small-scale agriculture, and the ruinous consequences of the world and civil wars and foreign intervention made up the conditions under which a new society began to develop in our country.

The following data attest to the tremendous difficulties experienced in those days. Production in heavy industry in 1920 was almost seven times lower than in 1913. Steel smelting decreased by more than 20 times. In comparison with the prewar level, cast iron production was 2.7 percent, cement production was 2.4 percent, and cotton fabric production was 4 percent. The harm done by 4 years of the imperialist war and 3 years of the Civil War was tremendous, totaling 50 billion gold rubles.

Most factories and plants were not working due to a lack of raw materials and fuel. Many mines were flooded and rail transportation was disorganized. The country, especially its industrial regions, experienced an acute shortage of food. "Russia emerged from the war," V. I. Lenin said, "in a condition most closely resembling that of a person who had been beaten half to death: It had been pounded for 7 years, and now, God help us, it was supposed to get along on crutches!" ("Poln. sobr. soch." (Complete Collected Works), Vol 43, p 68). The most decisive and energetic steps had to be taken to improve the position of the laborers and elevate the country's productive forces. This is why the party and people placed their main priority on recovering from the ruins and restoring the republic's national economy.

Peaceful construction began in a complex international situation. Having been defeated in the war against Soviet Russia, imperialists in the USA, England, France, Japan, and other bourgeois countries proposed insidious plans for economic strangulation of the new social structure, and they awaited a convenient moment for resuming armed intervention. The Communist Party was aware of the growing threat from the imperialist world. Appealing to all party organizations, in a circulating letter dated 12 January 1921 the party Central Committee pointed out that the army had to be preserved, and that its battleworthiness had to be raised. "The day we weaken our forces will be the day of a new invasion of our country," the Central Committee of the

RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] warned. "We would commit a terrible crime against the revolution if we ever forget this...

"The present period of transition is an extremely dangerous period for our army and for the revolution. Any uncautious step may be the last one."

The program for postwar reorganization of the Red Army was developed at the 10th RKP(b) Congress, held in March 1921. Lenin's premises on the ways for strengthening the country's defenses and raising the battleworthiness of the army and navy in times of peaceful socialist construction were confirmed at the congress. The congress noted that a regular Red Army, reduced in manning at the expense of senior age groups, had to be the backbone of the Soviet Union's armed forces. The need for enlarging worker representation in the army and navy and increasing the number of communists was emphasized. Much attention was devoted to creating special technical units and to strengthening the Workers and Peasants Red Fleet.

However difficulties of the restoration period made the tasks of military development complex. The country needed working hands more than ever before. Considering the conditions of peacetime and the economic possibilities, the strength of the armed forces had to be reduced, but in such a way as to not weaken their combat readiness, which on the contrary had to be increased. It was with this purpose that a military reform was conducted in 1924-1925 by decision of the party. The basic content of this reform was as follows: transition to a mixed territorial-regular system of military development; reorganization of military control agencies; creation of national military formations; reinforcement of the army by technical units; reorganization of the military personnel training system; introduction of one-man command; improvement of the work of the military rear services; alteration of the official organizational structure of units and formations; improvement of ideological-political indoctrination of personnel in the army and navy.

All military control agencies underwent major reorganization. Special attention was devoted to raising the leading role of the RKP(b) in problems of military development and in the life and activities of the armed forces. Young officers who had been nurtured by the party and had participated in the Civil War were promoted to positions of command. A faithful follower of Lenin, the famous troop commander M. V. Frunze was appointed chairman of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council and Peoples Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs by decision of the January (1925) Plenum of the CC RKP(b).

During this period the Red Army developed on the principle of combining regular units with territorial formations. By the end of the military reform the armed forces had a firm official manning of 562,000 persons. Twenty-six rifle divisions and almost all of the cavalry, technical units, and navy had been reorganized as regular units. Territorial troops made up 36 rifle and one cavalry division, an armored train regiment, three national regiments and several troop artillery subunits and units. This was a necessary step: The state had to economize on army maintenance. At the

same time the mixed organization of the armed forces insured that their combat readiness and their readiness for mobilization would be at the necessary level.

The most important result of the military reform was transition to one-man command as the most expedient method of troop command and control. In March 1925 the CC RKP(b) published the letter "On One-Man Command in the Red Army" for all party organizations. It emphasized that transition to one-man command would increase the social and political importance of command personnel and place them in a close relationship with local party and soviet agencies. To solve this problem, the party imposed considerable tasks upon political organizers and commissars, who served as the promoters of its policies. Introduced gradually, one-man command strengthened military discipline, raised the battleworthiness of the army and navy, raised the creative initiative of commanders, and increased their responsibility for the status of troop combat and political training.

Constant attention was devoted to improving party-political work in the armed forces. The new Party Charter adopted by the 14th RKP(b) Congress was important in this connection. The charter clearly spelled out the structure of the Red Army's party-political machinery, and it emphasized that overall leadership was to be provided to party work in the army and navy by the RKKA [Workers and Peasants Red Army] Political Directorate operating with all of the rights and privileges of a military department of the Central Committee. As a result of the military reform the number of party and Komsomol members in the army increased to 26 percent. By the end of 1925 the Soviet Armed Forces contained 74,800 communists and about as many Komsomol members (twice more than at the beginning of the reform). The number of laborers in the army's party organization climbed to 40 percent. A 2-year program of political indoctrination and training was introduced for Red Army soldiers.

The military reform had a fruitful influence on all spheres of the armed forces' activities. The troop supply system was reorganized, the order of military service and conscript training was spelled out clearly, basic training was improved, and new military regulations and manuals were written.

Showered by concern from the party and all Soviet people, the Red Army improved and grew stronger with every year. Aggressors attempting to attack our motherland were soon persuaded of its strength. In 1929 international imperialism, hoping to draw the USSR into war, provoked a conflict along the China-East Railroad, which belonged to our country. Chinese and Manchurian militarists seized this railroad in a surprise raid. The Soviet Union was forced to repell the provocateurs, who had no intention of resolving the conflict by peaceful means. Units of the Far Eastern Army headed by V. K. Blyukher destroyed the enemy troops to the man jointly with seamen of the Amur Naval Flotilla, demonstrating good combat skills, valor, and heroism.

Completing the presentation of material of the first problem, the instructor should conclude that as a result of implementing the defense measures suggested by the party, the battlepower of the armed forces increased

significantly by the end of the 1920's. However, in technical respects our army and navy were still behind the armies of the leading capitalist countries. The country's economic position and the level of development of war industry could not support the Red Army with a sufficient quantity of the latest combat equipment. This task could be completed only following all-out development of the economy and creation of a new material-technical base in the Soviet Union. This task was completed in the years of the first five-year plans.

2. Growth of the Battlepower of the Army and Navy During the Prewar Five-Year Plans

The Soviet Union underwent a great historic turning point in the late 1920's. "...Under the guidance of the Communist Party," reads the CC CPSU decree "On the 50th Anniversary of the First Five-Year Plan for Development of the USSR National Economy," "the Soviet people began a heroic struggle to implement the First Five-Year Plan, which was fundamental to implementation of Lenin's program for construction of socialism in the Soviet Union. This was the first integrated plan spelling out scientifically grounded rates and proportions of economic and social development for the country."

The course taken opportunely by the party toward industrialization of the country and collectivization of agriculture, and the selfless labor of the Soviet people made it possible to transform the USSR into a leading industrial-kolkhoz power within a short period of history. Heavy industry with a highly developed machine building sector was organized. A powerful material-technical base was placed beneath the national economy, one capable of supporting technical reconstruction of all sectors on the basis of new technology. The party successfully completed the hardest task of the socialist revolution following attainment of power by the working class--conversion of millions of small privately owned peasant farms to the collective system, to socialism.

The country experienced a cultural revolution of unprecedented scale. Illiteracy was abolished, and technical education began to be offered on an extensive basis. The Soviet Union transformed more and more from a backward agrarian country into a powerful industrial-kolkhoz power enjoying a high level of cultural development.

During the prewar five-year plans the gross production of all USSR industry increased by almost four times, while production by the machine building and metalworking sectors increased by 12 times. The Soviet Union took first place in Europe and second place in the world in industrial production volume. This made is possible to lay a strong foundation for growth in the military-economic potential, and to create the necessary conditions for reequipment of the army and navy.

Reinforcement of the Red Army's battlepower and the urgency of the need for its reequipment were dictated by the entire international situation. The

protracted world economic crisis, which achieved its peak in 1929, put the economies of the capitalist countries several decades behind. The economic crisis and the depression revealed all of the fundamental contradictions of capitalism, intensified the nonuniformity of development in capitalist countries, sharpened their struggle for markets, spheres of influence, and territory, and led to intensified reaction, to more energetic military preparations. Two seats of war developed as a result. The first arose in the Far East in 1931, when imperialist Japan unleashed aggressive actions against China. Japanese imperialists occupied Manchuria and began preparations to seize all of China and then to attack the Soviet Union. The second, principal seat of war was formed in Central Europe. At the beginning of 1933 the German monopolies placed the fascists in power. On assuming power, German fascism initiated a reign of terror against all progressive forces in the country, and in its foreign policy it assumed the course of gaining world supremacy. In fall 1936 Germany and Japan signed the so-called "Anticomintern Pact," which fascist Italy also joined a year later. Thus formed the aggressive Berlin-Rome-Tokyo fascist block against the Soviet Union.

Feeling that the bourgeois governments of England, France, and the USA would not interfere, fascist countries resorted to military adventures more and more frequently. In October 1935 Italy seized Ethiopia in barbarian style, without declaring war. A year later republican Spain fell sacrifice to military intervention by Germany and Italy.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government understood the danger presented by the policies of the fascist countries, and so the problems of socialist construction and the country's defense capabilities were resolved in their organic unity.

Owing to the attention of the party and the selfless labor of the working class, engineers, technicians, and our scientists and designers, production of various sorts of armament and combat equipment was organized and significantly enlarged. Growth in tank production made it possible to begin formation of mechanized corps and brigades. New branches of troops developed--armored, chemical, airborne, and air defense. Aviation enjoyed further qualitative development. The air force began to be rearmed with fighters and bombers that were sophisticated for that time. Their speed, range, and bomb load increased significantly. Much work was done to reequip and enlarge the number of surface ships and submarines. Creation of the Pacific Fleet began in 1932, and that of the Northern Fleet began in 1933.

The organizational structure of the Soviet Armed Forces was improved concurrently. Transition from the the mixed territorial-regular principle of the Red Army's organization to the single regular unit principle was a significant step in this direction. Transition of the entire army to the regular unit principle necessitated fundamental reorganization of troop command and control agencies, both central and local. The Revolutionary Military Council, which operated on the basis of the rights and privileges

of a board of the Peoples Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs, was abolished, and the Peoples Commissariat was renamed the USSR Peoples Commissariat of Defense. The RKKA staff was reorganized as the General Staff.

The overall structure of military command agencies that evolved by 1939 generally satisfied the new conditions for development of the Soviet Armed Forces. It permitted implementation of the Communist Party's military policy, insured that troop command and control would be stable, and promoted maintenance of constant combat readiness.

In September 1935 the USSR Central Executive Committee and Council of Peoples Commissars approved a new statute on military service of RKKA Commanders. It spelled out the time of mandatory military service and presented the order of making appointments and awarding military ranks, and other problems. New rank insignias corresponding to the military ranks were established for all commanders, and a new uniform was introduced. In August 1937 the following ranks were added: junior lieutenant, junior political instructor, and junior technician. The highest military rank, Marshal of the Soviet Union, was awarded for the first time on 20 November 1935 to V. K. Blyukher, S. M. Budennyy, K. Ye. Voroshilov, A. I. Yegorov, and M. N. Tukhachevskiy.

The changes that occurred in the army's armament and organization made it necessary to develop military theory further. Many new problems requiring theoretical substantiation and generalization arose in the course of military development.

First of all we had to determine the extent to which development of military affairs reflected upon the nature and features of future warfare, we had to determine the role and missions of the arms and services in a future war, and we had to develop the most suitable tactics of armed conflict and methods of troop combat and political training.

Soviet military theory developed under the guidance of the Communist Party, through the combined efforts of Soviet troop commanders, and through the collective labor of military academies and central and district directorates. Outstanding troop commanders and military officials in our country made a great contribution to solving the general problems of military theory--M. V. Frunze, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, A. I. Yegorov, B. M. Shaposhnikov, I. E. Yakir, R. P. Eydeman, I. P. Uborevich, V. K. Blyukher, and others.

The theoretical premises suggested were checked out and refined in the course of command-and-staff and troop exercises. The largest maneuvers were conducted in September 1935 in the Kiev Military District. During this time the tactics of penetrating enemy defenses with a rifle corps reinforced by artillery and tanks, and of exploiting a breakthrough with mobile formations interacting with airborne troops were practiced.

In fall 1936 the army held major maneuvers in the Belorussian Military District. Practice was afforded in joint actions by rifle, cavalry, and mechanized formations, and by aviation and airborne troops.

The methods of use of naval forces in joint and independent actions were tested in naval exercises and maneuvers. Units and formations of the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific fleets practiced combat missions associated mainly with supporting ground troops on maritime axes.

The scope of the combat training and its results attested to growth in the military proficiency of all categories of personnel, and to the fact that the army and navy had transformed into a well organized and trained force, ready to honorably repel enemies of our motherland. During these years Soviet soldiers had to halt the aggressive intrigues of imperialist militarists and stand in armed defense of the state interests of the USSR many times. Thus in summer 1938 Japan initiated a military conflict in the vicinity of Lake Khasan with the goal of seizing the Soviet Far East. The Far Eastern Front decisively repelled the invaders, expelling them from Soviet land. The aggressors learned their lesson.

In May 1939 Japanese militarists attempted a new adventure, initiating an undeclared war against the Mongolian Peoples Republic in the vicinity of the Khalkhin-Gol River. This time the Japanese militarists wanted to seize the eastern bulge of the territory of Mongolia, with which the USSR had signed a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance, and then to cross our border, interdict the Siberian Rail Trunkline, and cut off our Far East. At the end of August the largest enemy grouping was encircled and annihilated by the combined efforts of the Red Army and the army of the Mongolian Peoples Republic.

The operation was successful due to the high skill and extreme heroism of the Soviet and Mongolian troops. One of our tanks was hit during a battle deep in enemy defenses. The commander was killed. The tank's driver-mechanic, Komsomol Member I. Prosolov, was left alone. The Japanese tried to capture the Soviet combat vehicle. With accurate machinegun fire Prosolov annihiliated several dozen Japanese and held on until his comrades could come to his aid. For his act of heroism Prosolov was awarded the lofty Hero of the Soviet Union title.

Completing presentation of material on the second problem, it would be desirable to emphasize that the Soviet Armed Forces climbed to the level of the requirements of modern warfare in the years of the prewar five-year plans. This became possible as a result of the titanic amount of work done by the Communist Party to strengthen the army and navy, the dependable defenders of the achievements of Great October. New harsh trials awaited them in the future.

1. The Growing Threat of Military Invasion of the USSR, and Measures Implemented by the Communist Party to Strengthen the Country's Security

As a result of the economic crisis of 1917 the capitalist world entered a time of new economic, political, and military upheavals. The struggle between two of the largest imperialist powers for spheres of influence, markets, and colonies intensified on the world arena. Fascist Germany and its partners in aggression--fascist Italy and militarist Japan--assumed the advance guard of international imperialist reaction. In spring 1938 fascist Germany annexed Austria and prepared to seize Czechoslovakia. The world faced a real threat of a second world war.

The Soviet Union was the only country which decisively protested Hitler's seizure of Austria. The Soviet government proposed to the western powers that we organize active actions preventing further development of fascist aggression. However England, France, and the USA continued to adhere to a policy of "nonintervention," and they condoned the aggression in the hope that the fascist bloc would next turn its power on the USSR, thus weakening their competitors and ensuring their world supremacy.

In September 1938, at a conference in Munich, England and France, with American approval, agreed to transfer part of the territory of Czechoslovakia to Germany. The disgraceful Munich Pact, which became synonymous with international political treachery, signified direct encouragement of aggression and promoted initiation of World War II. The Soviet Union's government had no more doubts as to the meaning and nature of English-French-American policy. Under these conditions it agreed to sign a non-aggression pact with Germany. This pact was signed in August 1939. It did not alleviate the threat of fascist aggression but it provided the Soviet Union enough time to prepare its defenses and neutralize the danger of being dragged into a war on two fronts in a situation extremely unfavorable to the Soviet Union. Moreover the pact straitened the hopes of the imperialists for creating a unified anti-Soviet front.

Soviet foreign policy foiled imperialists' attempts at resolving their contradictions at the expense of the USSR. Contrary to the designs of the Munich conspirators, World War II began within the capitalist world itself. On 1 September 1939 fascist Germany attacked Poland. On 3 September England and France declared war on Germany, but they did not undertake any sort of decisive actions. They continued to provoke Germany into war with the Soviet Union. But the plans of the English and French ruling circles fell through once again. Fascist German troops defeated Poland in short time, and then, assuming an offensive against the English and French armies in spring 1940, they occupied Belgium and Holland. Denmark and Norway soon suffered the same fate. On 14 June German troops occupied Paris without a battle, and on 22 June France signed the Acts of Surrender. By summer 1941 fascist Germany controlled practically all of Europe, together with its powerful economic resources, its rich natural resources, and its manpower.

Analyzing the occurring events, the party Central Committee and the Soviet government became more and more convinced that Hitler's clique would not observe its side of the nonaggression pact for very long. The rapid advance of German troops to the eastern borders of Poland carried the threat of enslavement of the peoples of the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia. In order to rescue the public of these regions from the fascist occupation, by order of the Soviet government on 17 September 1939 the Red Army crossed the border and placed millions of Ukrainians and Belorussians under its protection, subsequently uniting them with their brothers in the East, in the Ukrainian and Belorussian Soviet socialist republics.

But the peoples of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia continued to face a real threat of fascist German aggression. As a result of the selfless revolutionary struggle, under the guidance of communist parties the laborers of these countries overthrew the bourgeois governments and established peoples governments, which asked the Soviet Union to accept the Baltic republics into the USSR. In August 1940 the USSR Supreme Soviet satisfied this request. The family of Soviet republics was joined by the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian SSR. In that same year the Soviet Union also annexed Bessarabia, which was forcibly taken from our country in 1918, and northern Bukovina.

In 1939 the imperialists managed to provoke Finnish reactionaries into a conflict with the USSR. England and France provided active assistance to them, supplied arms, and even intended to send their troops. However, defeat of the Finnish Army foiled these plans. In March 1940 a peace treaty was signed between Finland and the USSR in Moscow.

The Soviet Union's consistent and decisive position foiled the plans of the imperialists to seize advantageous springboards for war against the socialist countries in 1939 and 1940. The state border was moved away from the most important administrative and industrial centers of the USSR, and its strategic position was improved. This strengthened the security of our country and added a number of important tasks to the army's and navy's construction. The Baltic Military District was created. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet received new naval bases. Work was started to strengthen the state borders of the USSR.

Considering the ever-increasing military danger hanging over our country, the party and the Soviet government did everything to develop the material-technical base of the country's defense. In the prewar years, defense industry production increased by an average of 39 percent each year, while growth in all industrial production was 13 percent. The principal efforts of aviation and tank industry and ship building were directed at assimilating and producing new models of armament.

In cooperation with workers of aviation industry, Soviet aircraft designers created the YaK-1, MiG-1, and LaGG-3 fighters and the Pe-2 dive bomber in the prewar years. The technical flying data of the new airplanes were on par with modern requirements, and some of the planes were the best in the world. The IL-2 ground attack airplane became an unsurpassed war machine.

A new stage began in Soviet tank building with creation of the KV-1 heavy tank and the T-34 medium tank, which had no equals in any other country. During 1940 and in the first half of 1941 industry produced 639 KV tanks and 1,225 T-34's. However, the proportion of new models in the total production volume was still insufficient. The Soviet Navy enjoyed further development. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War it had 276 ships of the principal classes, to include three battleships, seven cruisers, 212 submarines, 54 flotilla leaders and destroyers, and 287 torpedo boats.

Thus the equipment level of the army and navy was increased significantly in the prewar years. USSR defense industry, relying on heavy industry created in the prewar five-year plans, increased the pace of production of new forms of armament and combat equipment.

The quickly growing threat of war imposed new, higher requirements on troop organization and training. On 1 September 1939 the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the Law on the Universal Military Obligation. It confirmed transition of the armed forces to the regular unit principle of organization, and it established longer terms of service for the rank and file and for junior commanders. As a result the strength of the army and navy increased by 2.8 times between 1939 and mid-1941 to more than 5 million men. This made it possible to form 125 new divisions. The official organization of formations and units in all arms and services underwent concurrent improvement.

Growth in the strength of the army and navy, improvement of their organization, and a significant increase in the proportion of technical and special branches of troops necessitated recruitment of a large number of new commanders, political workers, and technicians. It was for this reason that the network of military schools and academies was expanded significantly. Commanders with a higher and special education were trained by 19 academies, 18 military schools at civilian institutions of higher education, and seven higher naval schools. In 1938-1940 the secondary military training institutions trained about 130,000 middle-grade commanders for the army and navy.

Generalizing the experience of combat activity at Lake Khasan, the Khalkhin-Gol River, and Finland, the Communist Party demanded in its March 1940 Central Committee Plenum that the military leadership improve the troop training and indoctrination system and raise the combat readiness and battleworthiness of the armed forces. Bringing the nature of daily training closer to the conditions of real combat was assumed as the goal. The principle of "teaching the troops that which they would need in war, and only what is done in war" became the army's motto. Many lessons were moved out of the classrooms and into the field, and the proportion of night lessons and exercises was increased.

Approval of the new text of the military oath and the new order of its acceptance in January 1939 by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet was an important event in construction of the Soviet Armed Forces. It had

great significance to indoctrinating the Soviet troops in the spirit of devotion to the socialist motherland, and of a readiness to defend it courageously and competently, with honor and merit.

The principal factor which defined the subsequent scope of party-political work in the troops was growth of party organizations. They were staffed mainly by enlisted men and junior commanders. While at the end of 1938 2% percent of these political workers were party members, this proportion attained more than 40 percent by mid-1940. Party organizations were created in almost half of the companies, batteries, and subunits equal to them. Together with the political organs, they directed the soldiers' efforts at improving their combat proficiency and mastering the equipment and weapons, and they indoctrinated them in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and the readiness to selflessly defend the socialist motherland.

The Komsomol organizations of the army and navy grew and strengthened. By summer 1941 they numbered more than 2 million persons. The army and navy Komsomol members channeled their efforts at providing help to young soldiers studying military affairs and at assisting commanders and political workers to strengthen military discipline and improve indoctrination of young soldiers.

On the whole, party-political work played a tremendous role in improving the morale of the Soviet soldier, increasing their unity and discipline, and raising the combat readiness and battleworthiness of the troops.

In the conclusion of his lecture (narration) the propagandist should emphasize that in the period between the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War, the party followed the commandments of V. I. Lenin concerning the need for dependably protecting the socialist fatherland. Development of the armed forces was insured through the titanic efforts of the Soviet people under the guidance of the Communist Party. In relation to their fighting qualities, our armed forces were not inferior to the strongest capitalist armies, and in terms of morale our forces were immeasurably superior to them.

The fundamental advantages of the socialist structure over the capitalist structure had an effect on defense missions.

But aggressive imperialist circles are still not giving up; they are constantly building up their arms, striving to push the world into a new world war. The leaders of China are aligning themselves more and more closely with them. "In this situation," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out in his speech to the voters of the capital's Baumanskiy election district, "our party's Central Committee and the Soviet government are applying maximum effort to develop cooperation with the forces of peace, liberty, and progress, to foil the intentions of aggressive circles, to forward and deepen relaxation of international tension, and to reliably insure the Soviet people and our allies and friends the possibility for living and working in peace."

The First Session of the Ninth Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet, held in April of this year, has become a prominent event in the political life of our motherland. In an atmosphere of complete unanimity and great enthusiasm, the highest organ of state rule once again elected CC CPSU General Secretary, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to the post of chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which attests to the high authority of the Leninist party, and which satisfies the interests of communist construction. Soldiers of the USSR Armed Forces, and all Soviet people, avidly approve the decisions of the April (1979) CC CPSU Plenum and of the First Session, Ninth Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet, as well as the wise Leninist domestic and foreign policy of the Communist Party and Soviet government, aimed at improving the welfare of the Soviet people and strengthening the economic and defensive power of the motherland.

Students should study the following works during independent study hours: V. I. Lenin's "On the Domestic and Foreign Policy of the Republic" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 44, pp 296-300); Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report "Report to the CPSU Central Committee and the Party's Subsequent Tasks in Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" (Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress), Politizdat, 1976, pp 22-25, 75-76, 83); Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech to the electorate of the Baumanskiy election district, Moscow (PRAVDA, 3 March 1979); Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's statement at the First Session, Ninth Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet (PRAVDA, 17 April 1979); Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's memoirs "Malaya zemlya" (The Little Land) (Politizdat, 1978); Chapter 2 of the training manual "Na strazhe Rodiny" (Standing Watch over the Motherland) (Voyenizdat, 1978).

During the hours of mass political work it would be desirable to organize meetings for the personnel with veterans of the Soviet Armed Forces, and in the evening it would be a good idea to show the art film "Officers" and documentaries "Bravery" and "On the Banks of the Khalkhin-Gol."

Making the preparations for the seminar lessons on this topic, it would be suitable for the propagandist to make use of sheet 5 in the visual aids album "Vooruzhennyye Sily SSSR na strazhe zavoyevaniy sotsializma" (The USSR Armed Forces Standing Guard Over the Achievements of Socialism) (Voyenizdat, 1976).

It would be suitable to discuss the following problems in the first seminar: 1. V. I. Lenin on strengthening the country's defense capabilities in the conditions of peaceful construction. 2. What is the essence of the Red Army's reorganization after the Civil War? 3. The activity of the Communist Party to create the material-technical base of the country's defense in the prewar five-year plans.

Discussion of the following problems is recommended in the second seminar: 1. Growth of the battlepower of the army and navy during the prewar five-year plans. 2. The bravery and valor displayed by Soviet soldiers in battles with Japanese aggressors at Lake Khasan and the Khalkhin-Gol River. 3. Indoctrination of Soviet soldiers in the spirit of selfless protection of the

motherland in the prewar years. 4. Measures implemented by the Communist Party in connection with the growing threat of the USSR's military invasion by fascist Germany.

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[418-11004]

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PENTAGON PROPAGANDA MACHINE'S REACTIONARY OBJECTIVES REVEALED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 79 signed to press 7 May 79 pp 87-91

[Article by Lt Col V. Amel'chenko]

[Text] Continued reinforcement of the positions of the forces of peace and socialism is a typical trait of international relations today. Events in the world arena are not at all developing in accordance with the scenario of bourgeois politicians, ideologists, and propagandists. Marxist-Leninist ideology and the ideals of socialism are having a growing influence on the minds and feelings of millions of people, especially in countries that have recently gained national independence and assumed a course of independent development.

The arsenal of capitalist apologists does not contain ideas that they could contrast with the ideas of peace, liberty, democracy, and socialism. This is why they resort to the poisonous weapons on misinformation, slander, and falsification. As long ago as in 1920 V. I. Lenin wrote: "Whenever the ideological influence of the bourgeoise upon the laborers declines, weakens, and collapses, the bourgeoise has resorted and will resort, always and everywhere to the most desperate lies and slander" ("Poln. sobr. soch." (Complete Collected Works), Vol 25, p 352).

Organs of reactionary press, radio, and television in the West are widening the psychological war against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. They are activating ideological sabotage against the young countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, attempting to hinder their forward movement on the road of independence and social progress.

The danger of imperialist propaganda lies in the fact that it is often offered in veiled form. "Imperialism cannot count on success by openly declaring its true goals," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. "It is forced to create an entire system of ideological myths that obscures the true meaning of its intentions and dulls the alertness of the people. It has created a gigantic propaganda machine for this purpose, utilizing all modern resources of ideological influence" (Aktual'nyye voprosy ideologicheskoy raboty KPSS" (Pressing Problems in Ideological Work of the CPSU), Vol 1, p 286).

The strategists of imperialism are aware that their social structure, which has outlived its time, can be maintained only on the condition that the laboring masses are kept ideologically blinded. This is precisely why brainwashing of the people of their country and other countries has become one of the most important functions of the capitalist state and of the mass media at its disposal. The activities of numerous bourgeois propaganda centers are expanding and intensifying significantly in the West.

In the USA, for example, the acute dissatisfaction of the ruling circles with the effectiveness of this activity led to fundamental reorganization of its foreign political propaganda service. On the initiative of President J. Carter, a new unified propaganda department was created out of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the State Department Office of Education and Culture at the beginning of 1978. It was once again reorganized in April 1978, and its name was changed to the Administration of International Ties (AIT). The goal of this reorganization, it was declared in Washington, is to "significantly improve the organizational side of foreign political propaganda."

The AIT has the rights and privileges of a cabinet department, and it answers directly to the White House. It is furnished with an impressive budget, which was over $400 million in fiscal year 1979, and it is to be even larger in 1980--$412.4 million. Thus the forces of foreign political propaganda in Washington have been regrouped and combined into a unified mechanism of psychological warfare and ideological sabotage.

The Pentagon's propaganda machine plays a far from secondary role in this mechanism. Until relatively recently, this area of the U.S. Defense Department's activities was kept under wraps. In 1970 U.S. Senator William Fulbright, who had been chairman of the Senate commission for foreign affairs for many years, published the book, "The Pentagon's Propaganda Machine," in which he cited persuasive facts concerning the extensive and purposeful activities of the U.S. Defense Department aimed at shaping public opinion in that country and abroad in support of militarism, the arms race, and preparations for war. Noting that the power of the Pentagon comes from two principal sources--money and weapons, Fulbright also indicated the third, outwardly not so obvious source of power--information control. Moreover Fulbright is not alone in this conviction. Somewhat later the American journalist Bruce Ladd wrote the following in the weekly U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT: "The third source of the Pentagon's power--ideological control--attracts less attention. Having tremendous resources at its disposal, the military estate has the possibility for exercising more ideological control than any other government agency." Fulbright submitted a proposal to the U.S. Congress to reduce the Pentagon's propaganda activities, and to report to Congress every half year on its activities involving distribution of films among the civilian public, the mailing of materials for radio and television broadcasts and for periodicals, organizing free flights aboard military airplanes for reporters and so on. But the senator's proposal was not accepted; it was not even put up to a vote. This is unwise, if we

consider that it was precisely in those years, the years of aggressive war in Indochina, that the process of militarization of American foreign policy came to its conclusion. The Pentagon began devoting significant attention to international problems and foreign political propaganda, and it channeled the efforts of the military-industrial complex at supporting its viewpoints and interests.

Possessing many tens of billions of dollars in budgetary allocations, American military leaders have the possibility for spending hundreds of millions of dollars on domestic and foreign propaganda each year. Just in the 1977-1978 fiscal year alone, according to Senator Proxmire's data, the Pentagon spent about $300 million for these purposes. As the U.S. military budget grows, allocations for militarist propaganda are also increasing.

The American defense department has at its disposal a far-reaching machine having massive ideological influence on both Americans and millions of people in other countries. According to a report in ARMED FORCES JOURNAL the USA publishes more than 1,400 military publications, to include over 1,000 newspapers and journals (the ground forces publish a little more than 100 journals and 187 newspapers, the navy publishes 127 and 203, and the air force publishes 116 and 598 respectively). One out of every 20 periodicals published in the USA is a military periodical, and one out of every 19 newspapers is an official military publication.

Moreover the Pentagon has the possibility for broadly utilizing the corresponding channels of civilian organizations, and of public and private mass media. Thus the defense department regularly furnishes propaganda material to 1,700 daily newspapers.

Journalists who report on the Pentagon's activities in a light favorable to it are invited, "as a reward," to contribute articles to military newspapers and periodicals for substantial honoraria. They are the ones who receive operational information for publication in civilian press first hand. Those who attempt to illuminate events objectively, meanwhile, are banned from the information sources, and they are placed under observation by the Pentagon's special "security service." Similarly as with the CIA, the U.S. Defense Department has been caught red-handed many times tapping and recording the telephone conversations of journalists, tailing them, and so on.

The staff of the U.S. Defense Department contains more than 3,000 specialists--journalists, psychologists, sociologists, and linguists--dealing with the problems of raising the propagandistic effectiveness of materials furnished to the mass media. In order to show that the notorious principle of "freedom" of the bourgeois press applies to the armed forces as well, the Pentagon contracts its information out to newspapers put out by commercial publishing houses. It does this to lead the public to believe that American servicemen obtain their information from sources that are not under the control of the defense department.

In reality, however, any military agency that signs a contract with a civilian publishing house places qualifications upon the nature of information that may be published in the "unofficial" military press. Moreover the U.S. Army's "Command Information Regulations" state: "A commander signing a contract with a civilian publishing house is entitled and obligated to prohibit distribution of any issue of the publication if, in the commander's opinion, it is in conflict with the highest interests of the command."

Many of the Pentagon's publications are purely propagandistic, political organs. These include the newspaper STARS AND STRIPES, the weekly ARMY TIMES, the journal SOLDIERS, and others. But even the "professional" military publications, for example the journal MILITARY REVIEW, the bulletin COMMANDER'S DIGEST, and journals published by the various arms and services do not at all remain "outside of politics and propaganda," as their editors attempt to persuade the readers. Giving the appearance of analyzing development of military thought and the status of the armed forces of countries in the two opposing sociopolitical systems, they slip in distortions, frighten the readers with a "Soviet threat," and suggest the notion that war against the "world of communism" is inevitable. In addition to publishing biased information, misinformation, and slander concerning the armed forces of the USSR and other socialist countries, these press organs broadly advertise open militarism, brutality, inhumanity, and the cult of force. The purpose of the published materials is, on one hand, to mask the true goals of aggressive American foreign policy and the arms race and, on the other hand, to create a favorable impression of the American Army, to persuade the readers of the authenticity of the intrusively promulgated myth of its special, "Messianic" role, that of serving as the bastion of the "free world," as defender against the notorious "Soviet threat."

The "professional" press organs of the American Armed Forces are intended for not only a narrow range of military specialists but also for a much larger audience in both the USA and abroad. Through these organs, the Pentagon tries to exert propagandistic influence upon large numbers of officers in other countries, especially developing countries, and through them upon all armed forces personnel. Take as an example the American journal MILITARY REVIEW. Between 1918 and 1946 it was distributed only within the country. Beginning in 1946 it began to be published in Spanish and Portuguese, in addition to English. Today the journal is distributed to more than 80 countries. Its subscribers include more than 540 American and 120 foreign libraries, and over 40 other foreign organizations and agencies. The editorial board of MILITARY REVIEW exchanges its journal for 140 periodicals published by different countries and 15 agencies. Forty-five American and foreign press organs have been given unlimited permission to borrow materials from the journal. The volume and format of MILITARY REVIEW were changed in April 1976. This was not the first attempt at changing the format and subsidiary pages of the journal with the goal of camouflaging its foreign political orientation. This is done to adapt the journal to the

reading audience, to give it the appearance of a solid theoretical organ that "objectively" illuminates the problems of military affairs. Such camouflage is also typical of all other so-called "professional" military publications in the USA.

Radio and television occupy a prominent place in the Pentagon's propaganda machine. The United States Defense Department controls more than 200 radio stations and over 40 television broadcasting centers located both in the USA and in many foreign countries containing American troops and bases. They are organized into five basic propaganda radio networks, three of which (European, Far East, and Caribbean) are intended not only for ideological processing of American troops but also for political influence on the people of foreign countries. The activities of the Pentagon's "own" radio stations and television broadcasting centers are supplemented by those of about 600 civilian commercial radio and television broadcasting centers on contract with the defense department or broadcasting programs prepared by propaganda agencies of the army, air force, and navy as an "information exchange" effort.

Special groups of military correspondents and film-makers prepare films and television tapes containing anticommunist and militarist propaganda, and propaganda on the U.S. Armed Forces. The Pentagon not only creates films through its own resources; it also finances private companies producing ultramilitarist motion pictures, such as the "Green Berets," which advertizes the "acts of heroism" by American special forces in Vietnam.

The Pentagon has a special organization administering its propaganda machine. It is headed by the so-called directorate for problems of military information, which is responsible directly to the defense department and which works through the public information services of the departments of the army, air force, and navy. The information services manage the problems of ideological indoctrination of servicemen and of publicizing the corresponding branch of the armed forces among the civilian public (or, as they say in the USA, "selling public opinion"). According to American regulations subunit, unit, and formation commanders bear the responsibility for the morale of personnel in the U.S. Army. At the same time there is also a professional, official staff of so-called information officers. Their functions include organizing actual ideological processing of the personnel, as well as dissemination of propaganda material among the civilian public. Public or command information briefings are held each week in the troops. Their purpose is to introduce certain stereotypes of bourgeois propaganda and official theses and formulas into the consciousness of the people. Special centrally published bulletins are read in the briefings. Anti-Soviet materials have occupied an especially large amount of room in such bulletins recently.

The military religious service, which is headed by the administration of the senior chaplain of the armed forces, also performs its activities in close contact with the "information service." It has corresponding administrations

in the army, air force, and navy, and its sections and departments in major formations, formations, bases, and military schools.

The "special services," which provide outlets for the personnel in their leisure time, are also associated with the Pentagon's propaganda machine. They manage enlisted men's, sergeants', and officers clubs, base theaters, libraries, and so on.

Congressman (D. Passel), who for a number of years headed a group of experts studying American "ideological operations" in the "cold war" era, worded quite openly the general tasks of all agencies in the United States managing foreign political propaganda. "Foreign political operations acquired a new dimension--ideological and psychological," Passel declared in congress. "Certain foreign political goals are attained by direct appeals to the peoples of foreign countries and not to their governments. Using modern communication instruments and technology, it has now become possible to reach large or influential segments of the public, to inform them, to control their behavior, and at times even to incite them to commit certain acts."

A typical feature of imperialist activities on the front of the ideological struggle is coordination of efforts on an international scale, as can be seen in examples of the myth of the "Soviet military threat," the unending propaganda campaign about the supposed infringement upon human rights in socialist countries, and so on. The propaganda services and centers of the Western powers and of China's Maoist leadership are coming closer and closer together on anti-Soviet, antisocialist soil.

The Pentagon's propaganda machine has in some aspects "relieved the burden" of the CIA and the U.S. State Department. Using the American Defense Department, imperialists have managed to "internationalize" the channels of ideological influence on world society, adding the information and propaganda services of the armies of other NATO countries to the propaganda machine of the American Armed Forces. Questions concerning ideological subversive activities making use of the mass media have become objects of regular discussion at meetings of the NATO council and conferences of various sorts of NATO committees. As an example in August of last year 150 specialists from NATO information and propaganda services met for 10 days on Crete in the city of Khania to discuss the "content, effectiveness, and preparation of information in military and other vitally important situations," "the planning of directed information," and so on. They also coordinated the plans, resources, and times of "psychological warfare" against the USSR and other countries of the socialist fraternity and against progressive forces in Western countries.

In periods between sessions and conferences of the executive organs of the North Atlantic bloc, coordination is provided to provocational and propagandistic activities directed against relaxation by the information service of NATO Headquarters in Mavre near Brussels. It is precisely from here that

regular lies about the "Soviet military threat" are transmitted. They are immediately accepted by pro-NATO press in capitalist countries and Peking propaganda. The materials of the information service are fabricated by "scholars" from the leading anticommunist centers of the West--high-placed generals and political officials of the capitalist world who have become skilled in anticommunism and anti-Soviet propaganda.

The NATO information service is closely associated with the radio stations "German Wave," "Radio Free Europe," and others. Colleagues of these stations are active participants of NATO's ideological sabotage on the airwaves.

Of course anti-Soviet fabrications by Maoists have recently been distributed more and more frequently by Pentagon and NATO propaganda channels. The shameless anti-Soviet stance of Peking is clearly to the liking of certain circles in the Pentagon and NATO feverishly lobbying to play out the "Chinese card," to strengthen the American-Chinese alliance against the USSR, and to render immediate aid to China in modernizing and equipping its armed forces.

American military newspapers and journals are now being fed materials written by authors who grossly distort facts and falsify events under the guise of "analyzing" the present state of military thought in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and of their armed forces. The possibilities of a "limited nuclear war" in Europe are discussed with open cynicism. Such provocative articles are also finding their way more and more frequently into the widely circulated newspapers. In particular the American newspaper NEW YORK TIMES recently noted that the idea of "limited nuclear conflict, as a supplement to the capability for participating in large-scale military operations," is supported by presidential assistant for national security Brzezinsky and U.S. Defense Secretary Brown.

Relaxation of tension is being subjected to fierce attacks. Attempts are being made to convince readers and listeners that relaxation has outlived its usefulness, that it is "unrealistic" and even "unpromising," especially for the West , and that the Soviet Union is supposedly working for relaxation only as a means to conceal one-sided growth in military power, intensifying the threat against Western powers. The obvious ridiculousness of such assertions does not embarrass their authors, who are simply satisfying the social order of the ringleaders of the military-industrial complexes.

One unique feature manifests itself extremely obviously today in the attempts by Pentagon propagandists to influence public opinion. The American Armed Forces are represented as the "main guarantee of peace," as the "foundation of international stability and security." The following thought is persistently impressed upon the consciousness of the common citizen in Western countries: "The military holds the key to peace; the greater the power of America and the higher the readiness of its soldiers to fight for liberty, the closer at hand is peace." Relaxation is believed to be

possible only on the condition that the war machine of the USA and the entire NATO bloc is permitted to grow. This is a practical manifestation of social demagogury--one of the leading principles of bourgeois propaganda.

According to testimony from a CBS foreign political correspondent, in October 1977, when real progress could be seen in Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks, the Pentagon organized a "leak" of biased figures concerning these talks, making it look as if the USA was "backing down all the way" and that the USSR would obtain one-sided advantages as a result. The goal of this "leak" was to turn the American public against the treaty and to activate the efforts of the enemies of relaxation in the U.S. Congress.

To the extent we can judge from materials published in the American military press, the leadership and the propaganda agencies of the Pentagon and various militarist organizations are subjecting military servicemen, the country's population, and world public opinion to ideological and psychological processing in the following basic directions:

discrediting the policy of relaxation and the course toward peaceful, equitable relations between the USSR and the USA;

"justifying" the need for increasing and modernizing American military power and intensifying the arms race;

rehabilitating the moral prestige of the U.S.Armed Forces, which had been undermined as a result of the defeat suffered in areas of aggression in Southeast Asia;

raising the moral-political readiness of armed forces personnel to participate in punitive operations against their own people and peoples fighting for national independence.

A typical trait of the Pentagon's militarist propaganda is its so-called manipulative nature. This term implies presence of an entire system of myths and stereotypes through which the propagandist forces the individual to look at the world. An example of such a manipulative approach can be found in the propagandistic stereotypes that could be found in Western newspapers, journals, and television and radio broadcasts during the recent imperialist aggression in Angola. Support of the legal government of this country by socialist countries was called "interference in internal affairs." And yet the aggressive actions of imperialists and their henchmen, and recruitment of mercenaries to fight the people of Angola were justified by the deceitful notion that this country had to be "rescued" from communists. The Pentagon's propaganda channels are now spreading contrivances and insinuations suggesting that the Soviet Union has a hand in events occurring in Afghanistan, Iran, and South Africa--in a word, wherever the people are fighting for their national liberation against the forces of imperialism, neocolonialism, and racism.

That propaganda is camouflaging subversive acts, ideological sabotage, and even military provocations, originating in neighboring countries, against countries in which popular revolutions have taken their course or the flame of the national liberation struggle is beginning to grow brighter.

Greater activity of subversive imperialist propaganda and growth in the aggressiveness of the ideological struggle are signs mainly that the world revolutionary process is continually deepening, that more and more of the masses are being liberated from the influence of bourgeois ideology. This is precisely what is forcing imperialist ideologists and politicians to assume a course of ideological sabotage and "psychological warfare." The merger of the propaganda machines of imperialist powers with foreign political and military departments and intelligence agencies, and various "reorganizations" are aimed at raising the effectiveness of the ideological struggle against countries of the socialist fraternity, against Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Understanding the groundlessness of their ideology, our class enemies are applying their principal effort to developing hostile subversive propaganda.

Such tactics and methods are alien to socialism. As CC CPSU General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said, "...we are against transforming ideology into the servant-woman of military staffs, and of the struggle between ideologies into a psychological war. Peaceful, honest competition of ideas and social practices: That is our principle" ("O vneshney politike KPSS i Sovetskogo gosudarstva" (On the Foreign Polity of the CPSU and the Soviet Government), Politizdat, 1978, p 721).

The intrigues of imperialist ideological saboteurs invariably suffer failure in the face of the inviolable ideological and political unity of Soviet society, the unforgiving socialist patriotism and internationalism of our people, closely united about the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee. However, as the Communist Party teaches the Soviet people, we must continue to display the highest political alertness, and we must decisively repel all attempts by imperialism and reaction to weaken our ideological potential. [419-11004]

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BOOK DESCRIBES LENIN'S ROLE IN NAVAL DEVELOPMENT

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 79 signed to press 7 May 79 pp 92-93

[Review by Capt 1st Rank G. Komarov of the book "V. I. Lenin i flot (1918-1920)" (V. I. Lenin and the Navy (1918-1920)) by B. I. Zverev, Voyenizdat, 1978, 296 pp, price 65 kopecks]

[Text] In addition to being a brilliant Marxist theoretician and the organizer and leader of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, V. I. Lenin was also an outstanding military figure. During the Civil War and the time of the foreign intervention he was the inspiration and organizer of our country's defense; he managed development of the Red Army and its combat activities, he participated directly in development of the principal operational plans, and he issued the most important directives to the military command.

Creation and administration of the Workers and Peasants Red Navy are inseparably associated with the name of the leader of the party and people. His administration was constant, purposeful, systematic, and concrete. More than 500 decrees and orders directly pertaining to the navy were published during the Civil War with the direct participation of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. This story is told in B. I. Zverev work "V. I. Lenin and the Navy (1918-1920)." Basing himself on Lenin's documents, party and government decisions, directives published by the Red Army Main Command, and memoirs of the participants of the struggle for victory and confirmation of Soviet power, the author successively traces the activities of V. I. Lenin and of Bolshevik naval organizations in all stages of the revolution and subsequent defense of the country.

The book naturally begins with a chapter devoted to the Communist Party as the organizer of the revolutionary forces of the army and navy in the struggle for dictatorship of the proletariat. It shows how V. I. Lenin directed the work of the Bolsheviks at ideological-political indoctrination and recruitment of the sailor masses for the struggle against Czarism. The works of the great leader, statements made by Bolshevik newspapers, leaflets, and the party's organizational efforts aboard ships and in the units all developed the class consciousness of naval seamen, and unified them and

armed them with a correct understanding of the political situation in the country. The most important result of the activity of V. I. Lenin and his colleagues was rebellion of the Baltic Fleet against the bourgeois government even before the armed uprising of October. The fleet became the dependable bulwark of the Bolshevik party. Lenin's plan for uniting the forces of the navy, laborers, and soldiers came into full fruition in the course of the revolution.

On the very day following the victory of the armed uprising, naval delegates to the 2d Congress of the Soviets created the Naval Revolutionary Committee under orders from V. I. Lenin; this committee was the first Soviet all-navy organ exercising leadership over the sailor masses in the struggle to strengthen and defend workers and peasants' rule. Together with Red Guards and revolutionary soldiers and under the direct leadership of V. I. Lenin, naval seamen suppressed the revolt of the military cadets in Petrograd and actively participated in battles against Kerenskiy's and Krasnov's counterrevolutionary forces.

Naval party organizations concurrently performed another highly important political function on orders from V. I. Lenin and the Bolshevik party--they mobilized naval personnel to suppress "nonmilitary forms" of resistance by the bourgeoise--that is, the attempts at sabotage by the former civil service, by administrative and technical personnel, and by all those who dreamed of restoring the old order and strangling the workers and peasants state. Breaking the resistance of the saboteurs, Red seamen at the same time participated actively in creating a new state administration and organizing the activities of the peoples commissariats and other central and local institutions.

Personnel of the new navy who were devoted to the revolution were nurtured and their ideological-political and organizational foundations were laid in battles to defend socialist achievements and in efforts at organizing agencies of peoples rule. On 31 January 1918 V. I. Lenin signed a decree creating the Workers and Peasants Red Navy.

One of the first measures of the party and government to strengthen party leadership of the navy--introduction of the "Interim Statutes on Commissars of the Naval Commissariat"--was also implemented at the beginning of 1918. Bolshevik organizations aboard ships and at naval bases, the book shows, initiated a great deal of work aimed at ideological indoctrination and organization; they explained the essence of the new principles of creation of the Soviet Republic's Armed Forces, and the need for defending the achievements of the proletarian revolution. Communists served as the example of high political awareness, they were the first to volunteer for the front, they united the politically most aware representatives of the laborers about the party, and they prepared them for the struggle against the enemies of Soviet rule.

The foresightedness of the leader of the revolution was also manifested in his concern for maintaining the navy in the event of future hostilities,

which seemed inevitable at that time. In order to keep German imperialists from seizing ships of the Baltic Fleet in Revel' and Gel'singfors in February 1918, Lenin resolutely demanded rescue of the fleet, and he managed to rebase the ships in Kronshtadt. As a result of the famous and unprecedented "ice campaign," which was conducted in a complex military-political situation and in difficult weather conditions, the main forces of the Baltic Fleet and considerable reserves of material and technical resources were saved, which had tremendous significance to the subsequent activities of the navy and to development of new formations in the course of the struggle against intervention by the Entente.

This book examines Lenin's leadership of the navy in light of the concrete general military-political situation. It contains a large number of documents signed personally by V. I. Lenin or adopted on his initiative, attesting to the fact that he did exercise leadership literally every day in the course of the Civil War.

In addition to analyzing V. I. Lenin's practical activities as the leader of the country's defense, the author reveals his outstanding contribution to solving the most important military problems predetermining the subsequent development of Soviet military science and art of war, to include ones such as the action of objective laws in war, the significance of moral and economic factors, and so on.

The book provides adequate attention to the combat activities of naval seamen on the Baltic and Black seas, on the Volga and Caspian, in the north, and on many rivers and lakes of the republic. This activity was subordinated to the common strategic goals of the armed conflict. V. I. Lenin and the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) carefully monitored the combat activities on marine and river lines of communication, and the use of the fleets as flotillas.

V. I. Lenin's instructions and party directives on operational utilization of the fleet forces were embodied in the decrees of the Council of Peoples Commissars and the Defense Council. Over 100 letters and telegrams signed by Lenin and assigning concrete tasks in repelling the enemy were sent to Petrograd, Murmansk, Arkhangel'sk, Petrozavodsk, Kazan', Nizhniy Novgorod, Tsaritsyn, Sevastopol', Baku, Astrakhan', and other port cities and bases.

The battlepower of the created army and navy was multiplied by the ideological maturity and class consciousness of soldiers fighting for the ideals of the October Revolution. A special chapter is devoted to ideological-political indoctrination and training of personnel of the Workers and Peasants Red Navy. It demonstrates that this work proceeded on the basis of the same program requirements imposed on the laboring masses of the Soviet Union. Concurrently the Communist Party fully considered the concrete missions of the navy, its class composition, and the unique features of the military-political situation in each stage of the Civil War.

All efforts at political and military indoctrination of the seamen were infused with Lenin's ideas concerning Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism and reinforcement of the unity of the army and people, of the union of workers and peasants, and of the friendships of peoples; these efforts were directed at insuring high combat readiness of the navy and its completion of its missions in the struggle against the internal and external counterrevolution.

The reader is given the opportunity to gain a fuller idea of how much V. I. Lenin did to develop science and technology. Immediately after the victory of Great October he ordered creation of dozens of institutes for fundamental and applied research, which promoted restoration and development of the country's productive forces and reinforcement of its defenses, its army, and its navy.

The book's concluding part demonstrates the way the Communist Party, which followed V. I. Lenin's commandments without deviation, manifested unweakening concern for strengthening the country's defense capabilities and improving the armed forces. The Soviet Navy now possesses sophisticated weapons and combat resources, ones which can support execution of the most complex missions, and destruction of any aggressor who might date to transgress upon the security of our borders.

Soviet naval seamen have inherited all that is best from the heroic history and experience of the domestic navy, they are carefully preserving and multiplying the glorious revolutionary and battle traditions of the Soviet Navy, and they find their strongest spiritual weapon in Lenin's commandments and in the leadership afforded by the Communist Party, its Central Committee, and by CC CPSU General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Chairman of the USSR Defense Council, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev.

Without a doubt the book "V. I. Lenin and the Navy" will be of significant assistance to commanders, political workers, and active party and Komsomol members involved in ideological indoctrination of the personnel and formation of high moral-combat qualities in naval seamen.
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